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dated 6th day of June, 1984 by David Baldwin, 
Gloria Baldwin and Ada Jones. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2: Hand written agreement 
dated 1st day of August, 1992 by David Baldwin and 
Ada Jones. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3: Letter dated May 7, 1993 
to David Baldwin RE: Tender signed by Ada Jones. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4: Letter dated June 9, 1993 
to David Baldwin RE: Answer to letter asking for 
a determination on the possible sale and 
separation of a home and business using the same 
commercial hoop up signed for Mark G. Nelson, 
Pres. Bolder Farmstead Water Co. by Elaine Roundy, 
Sec. for Mark Nelson. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5: Letter dated June 10, 1993 
to Billie RE: Billie's tender on the property for 
sale enclosed is letter from Bolder Farmstead 
Water Co. (Exhibit 4, Addendum) and the withdrawal 
of offer for sale of said property. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12: Letter from State of Utah 
signed Sandra K. Allen, Attorney Division of 
Environmental Response and Remediation to Jackson 
Howard RE: Jones/Baldwin Matter (Facility No. 
6000678, Release Id. EIWY Burr Trial Cafe, Highway 
12 Bolder, Utah) Dated November 2, 1995. 
Defendant's Exhibit 23: Letter to Billy from Dave 
RE: tentative price quote for the entire property 
@ $32,000.00 mailed December 2, 1992. 
Condensed Transcript pages 658-667. 
Annotation-Requisite Definiteness of price to be 
paid in event of exercise of option for purchase 
of property. 
1 Williston, Contracts, (3rd Ed. 1957) §41. 
Judgment of the Verdict by Plaintiff. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by 
Plaintiff. 
Partial Judgment and Decree by Plaintiff dated 
19th day of December, 1995 by Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs. 
First Amended Partial Judgment and Decree by 
Plaintiff filed with Garfield County on 3-8-96 
dated 6th day of March, 199 6 approved by Timothy 
Miguel Willardson, Attorney for Defendants. 
Judge's continuation instructions Instruction 9-21 
dated 3 0th day of November, 1995. 
Judge's Preliminary Instructions Instruction 1-8. 
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions dated 
Wednesday, November 22, 1995 signed by Timothy 
Miguel Willardson, Attorney for Defendants. 
Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions. 
ADDENDUM 1 
LEASE "AGREEMENT 
£ I ^C 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and'entered into this 
June, 19S4, by and between DAVID BALDWIN, hereinafter "s/err-od to ^  u 
as the "' ^ ^'•". '"^ frafrfrft ...f_'l l1 ' * « ^ and'"ADA JOrLEi-r-^frc&ina*te^- re^T 
..-——r&it^ r^  "" l 
ferred to'as the "Lesseet ' r S * i NESSETH: 
That the Lessor hereby leases to tne Lessees certain res-
taurant and service station property located in Boulae-, Garfield 
County, Stats of Utah, upon the following terms and c o n d i t i o n s : ^ 
?? (tr 
I. Tne term o(f this Lease shall be from June 1, 1 9 C ^ 
through May 21, 19S5, inclusive. Lesseei snail have the exclusive 
option to "enew this Lease for successive two-year te^ms tnereafte-, 
uo to a total of ten (10) ye"ars. Lessor covenants and warrants tnat 
ne has fjll rignt and authority to enter into this Lease
 f Agreement, ,,!/ 
for the full term hereof. * £ ? ' / i^tf 
Ml-
2. During the y*--**»-^ two-year term of tn^s .ease, the 
rental to oe paid by the Lesseei shall be the sum of ?~^jg—• pj^ f% 
month. Thereafter, the amount of such rental^hall bc""sub:act to 
re-negctiaticn among tne parties, but, nevertheless, snail not in-
crease more tnar a total of twenty percent (20*) above tne initial , 
rental amount04r -,^..- -r--~£T oe^iaonth. ****?' yo, , -£_ ^< cite M ^ 7 ^ v ' t / : ^  * p f ^ ' Xrai~ *~ ' r -> c t— w ' '- /'• r ,/j 
'3. At any time a u n n g the term of this Lease, or any ^ C 
successive renewal terms, Lessee* may exercise a first option to 
purchase the oremises and property, upon the following te rms and 
conaitions:/Vof ^ 0 ZXC**J O v ^ W - d W T u , ^ - V - o ^ c ^ c L o U ^ n 
A. The purchase price shall be f^xeC, at that time, 3t s*p 
fair market value, as established by the opinions of tnree (2) in-
dependent aooraisers, to be selected by mutual agreement of tne 
parties hereto. 
3. One-half of the aggregate sums paid as rental by the 
Lessees unoe r tne terms of this Lease, computed as of tnat aate, 
shall be aoDlied as a down payment, toward the purcnase o n c e of 
said premises and property, and shall be credited according 1)'. 
C. The remaining terms of such purchase shall be established 
at that time by mutual agreement of the parties hereto. 
4VY A. 
4. In addition to the rental specified herein, Lessees 
a g r e e - t o . pay j*l 1 uti 1 i ti es . and water charges, and shall be entitled 
5. - Lessees shall be entitled to make improvements upon 
the premises and. property, and agree to'maintain them in good repair 
and order, Lessor^ shall remain responsible ijid liable for any..major 
m a i n t e n a n c e or repairs upon the premises and property^ *—v«* ^Z/2P 
5. Lessor shall pay the real property taxesxupo-n jthe.p.refn-
ises and property, until Lessees exercise their option to purchase 
the same. 
7. Lessor shall retain and keep in force at all times 
adequate fire and hazard insurance upon the premises and property. 
Lessees shall provide their own insurance for their inventory and 
personal property upon the premises. 
8. Lessees shall have the right to sel^» transfer, or 
assign their interest under this Lease, after first obtaining the 
consent of the Lessor. 
9. At reasonable times, and upon reasonable notice. 
Lessor shall be entitled to inspect the premises, and to perform 
necessary repairs and maintenance thereon. 
10. In the event of default under the terms of this L e a s e , 
Lessor reserves the right, after ninety (90) days notice of such 
d e f a u l t , to terminate this Lease; to re-enter and take possession 
of the premises; and to re-let the same, and apply the proceeds 
thereof to the obligation of the Lessees hereunder. In that e v e n t , 
Lessees agree to voluntarily vacate and surrender the premises, and 
to restore them to as good or better condition as when they took 
11. If either party, for good cause, desires to terminate 
this Lease, they must first provide written notice to the other 
partyi at least ninety (90) days prior to the date of such pro-
posed t.ermi nati on. 
-2-
12. Lessees agree to comply wi th_ a I.I.. app 1 i cab I e f e d e r a l , 
s t a t e , and;1 oca 1.1aws< and o r d i n a n c e s . 
13. If. legal a c t i o n 1s. taken to enforce'the terms o f r t h l s 
A g r e e m e n t , the defaulting party shall pay all costs incurred in con-
n e c t i o n . w i t h such.action, including reasonable attorney's f e e s . 
14. -Tit.1s e x p r e s s l y u n d e r s t o o d and agreed that time is of 
the - v e r y essence of this Lease A g r e e m e n t . 
15. This Lease c o n t a i n s the entire agreement b e t w e e n the 
p a r t i e s , and may only be m o d i f i e d , in writing, signed by Doth p a r t i e s . 
16. This Lease shall be binding .upon, and shall inure to 
the benefit of, the parties' h e r e t o , and their respective h e i r s , 
legal representatives, s u c c e s s o r s , and assigns. 
DATED this /? day of June,' 1984. 
LESSOR: L E S S E E S : 
DAVID BALDWIN 
\=> L o ^ ; c C2> c'^d ^ w ^ 
MARILWN HANSEN ^ 
Lot s / ^ as RdCo^dUjr^- <bavRxM Couv,^ C ? * * 
• ^
 X 
o ^ f ^ - " fv^ssev^ C c a w e ^ / , ^ / " w *J 
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v ? C o o \ t « . -Evo f - ^ W - C o o l ^ 
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ADDENDUM 3 
May 7, 1993 
To: David Baldwin 
717 Country Plaza South 
Gilbert AZ 8523^ 
H ^ D E R 
By this document, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-27-1, et. sec.. I tender to you, pursuant to provision 
3A of die lease agreement between us, dated August 12, 1992, the purchase price of the premises as 
mav be established bv three independent aonraisers. 
In respect to the appraisal I am willing to work with you to select the appraisers or I am 
willing to select one, have you select one, and have the appraisers so. selected select a third. 
In respect to the purchase price, I will pay cash for the price determined and will expect to 
receive title by a Warranty Deed with Tlrie Insurance to ALIA standards. 
The deed to me must warrant that the property is free from environmental hazzards and will 
meet the Federal and Utah State environmental requirements. 
As an alternative to appraisal, I am willing to pay S40,000.00 for the property, that being 
what I believe to be the fair market value. 
I wouid like to close the transaction within thirty days at a tide company or law office of your 
choice, and I am willing to deposit the purchase price with such firm upon acceptance of this Tender. 
In the alternative I am willing to have my attorneys, Howard, Lewis & Petersen at 120 East 300 
North. Provo, Utah 84604, complete the documentation, or if you prefer a tide company, I wouid 
recommend Provo Land Tide Company at 255 East 100 South. Provo, Utah 84603. 
Box 1391 
Boulder, Utah 84716 
AJ/lm 
j:jones.itr 
ADDENDUM 4 
Boulder, Utah 
-rips a i Q G : 
Mr. David Baldwin 
?
: 3ox 1402 
Ecuidar, Utah 84726 
Dear David; 
In answer to your l e t t e r of June 2, 1392, asking 
for a d e t e r m i n a t i o n en the poss ib le sale and sep-
aration of a heme and business using the same 
commercial hook up. 
This i s a problem we have not had to address. As 
ycu suggested to s p l i t one share which cons t i tu tes 
a membership and c rea t ing two shares or two member-
ships i s something we can ' t do a t this time because 
of lack of suffleant water. 
Therais a l so a wait ing l i s t for memberships r ight now; 
and we a re no longer taking membership reques ts . We 
shall look ser iously a t th i s s i tua t ion and address 
i t , if i t i s pos s ib l e . We can see zhat in the future 
this could create a'problem for others who have home 
and business being served by the same membership. 
If you s t i l l have questions about this matter, feel 
free to contact us a t anv t ime . 
Sincere Recrards, 
Mark G. Nelson, P res . 
Boulder Farmstead Water Co, 
Elaine Roundy Sec. 
for Mark Nelson 
/rr* 4 
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ADDENDUM 6 
NCW-22-1995 IS:5? FROM HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN TO 
U/02/95 18:28 FAX 801 358 8853 DIV ENV RgSP REM 
13315751963 P. 32-^34 
B002/003 
U State of Utah 
! DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALTTY 
I DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION 
Mk*i*J 0. L*ovitt 
COVtRMU 
t % NWIWD, Ph.D. 
B«twtM D*aor 
Kiwi P. Oruy 
ttnct* 
[ 168 Nonh 1950 Woaf 
I P.O. Box 144940 
1 SattUte City, Utah 84114-4*0 
I (SCI) 53M10O Voice 
f (101) 3594SS3 F * 
($C!J53W«4TD.0. 
Novembers 1995 
ERRA-083-95 
Jackson Howard 
Howard, Lewis end Petersen 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O, Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re; Jones/Baldwin Matter (Facility No. 6000678, Release W. SIWY 
Burr Trail Cafe, Highway 12 Boulder, Utah) 
Dear Mr Howard: 
As we discussed yesterday, Robin Jenkins is the current project manager for the above referenced 
leaking underground storage tank sice. Ms. Jenkins has reviewed the above referenced leaking 
underground storage tank file. Gary Astin is an environmental scientist responsible for underground 
storage tank compliance. Mr. Astin has reviewed the underground storage tarik compliance file for the 
above referenced facility. Their reviews reflected the following information. 
Uadermmd Storage Tank Compliance File Review bv Gary Astin 
My review indicated that there appears to be two underground storage tank* based upon exposed product 
pipes above grade remaining after the removal of the dispensers. The tanks ere regulated under the Utah 
Underground Storage Tank Act ("Act"). The tanks are not in compliance with the Act or with the 
regulations implementing the Act, To be in compliance the tanks would have to be properly closed or 
upgraded- Proper closure would entail taking samples by a certified sampler. If closure samples indicate 
contamination, an investigation of the extent of the contamination must be performed. A corrective action 
plan must be prepared and implemented. Under the Act the owner or operator of the underground storage 
tanks may be ordered to do this work. In addition, the responsible parties* as that term is defined in the 
Aet» iuay be apportioned a share of the cost Finally, the owner or operator of the tanks is required to pay 
registration and petroleum storage tank fees. The amount owed for fees for this facility is $1546,72 
currently. If the tanks are promptly and property closed, there is a possibility that the petroleum storage 
tank fond fee portion of $3710.00 would be waived. 
Gary ^tut/cnvitocxrjental Scientist 
HTA ! 
Prima* on ftvyctod paper 
JO 
11/02/93 15:27 FAX 401 3*9 6«U My
 W HBP B a (21003/003 
Facility ID. #6000678, Release Id, EIWY 
Page 2 
leaking Underproiind Storage Tank Site File Review bv ttohm Janttni 
My review of the leaking underground storage tank case file indicated that a release was reported at this 
facility on April 3, 1995* According to the spill report, Frandne Peerer phoned the Division of 
Environmental Response and Remediation to report that she has observed product emanating from the 
diesel dispenser island. Under the Act and implementing regulation*, the owner or operator of the tanks 
is responsible for performing a site check to confirm the suspected release. If appropriate, the owner or 
operator is then responsible for investigating a release to define the extent and degree of contamination, 
for preparing a corrective action plan and cleaning up the release. Other responsible parties may be 
apportioned a share of the costs. 
In response to the spill repoTt this agency issued a request for site cheek to the property owner on reccfti, 
Mr. David Baldwin, Mr, Baldwin had a certified sampler, Tosha Hcyt, take samples. The soil sample 
taken from directly adjacent to the island, two feet below tie surface, showed non-detectable 
concentrations of the gasoline and diesel constituents analyzed The soli sample appears to have been 
properly taken. An above ground water sample was also taken but ^16 not satisfy the regulations which 
require that a representative ground water sample be collected. Based on the sample results, there appears 
to be no surface soil contamination associated with the open product pipe, but the samples do not indicate 
whether groundwater is contaminated or not* Tte absence of detectable water contamination is not 
representative of groundwater and does not indicate whether contamination is present at greater depths and 
distances from the source. As a cautionary note, please understand that contamination is often detected 
during closure when samples are taken at deeper levels The absence of contamination in the soil sample 
taken by Ms. Hoyt should not be relied upon as evidence thai contamination will not be detected during 
closure because the sample was taken from a shallow depth. 
Lvixonmental Scientist 
I trust that this information satisfies your request and that Mark Bertefecn's appearance on 
November 9,1995 will not be required. 
Sincerely, 
Sandra K. Allen, Attorney 
X>ivision of Environmental Response and Remediation 
SKA/al 
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ADDENDUM 8 
Page 658-661 Compressed Transcript 
Page 658 
[ 1] reads that estimating report, even assuming it was on the 
[ 2] right property and even assuming that it wis based on things 
[ 3] that were reliable and assuming that there is some 
[ 4] obligation to sell the property, there is still the problem 
[ 5] that on that report itself, it said that the cost of the 
( 6] property itself is significantly more than the valuations 
( 7] that are being used. It says that the cost of the land and 
[ 8] the buildings is $51,600, and these plaintiffs are asking to 
[9] sell the property for less than it would cost to build. 
[10] Furthermore, the agreement, if there is one and if 
[11J one can decide what it is, the two written documents-or the 
[12] tender and the last written document, and I believe the 
[13] first written document, also requires three appraisers. 
[14] Three appraisers have not rendered an opinion. 
[15] With respect to the tender, that alone should 
[16] defeat any call upon equity. That tender offer was drafted 
[17] by an attorney, Mr. Howard. It was sent by him to a person 
[18] whom he knew was not represented by counsel and it 
[19] referenced the wrong CODE provision. 
[20] Now it's true that you and I and Mr. Howard know 
[21 ] that lawyers now that et sequentes latin means "and the 
[22] following". Mr. Baldwin testified that he doesn't know to 
[23] this day yet what it means, accept now he's just learned. 
[24] That CODE provision says nothing about what is required from 
[25] a tender and Mr. Baldwin made a good faith offer to respond 
Page 659 
[ 1] to that 
[ 2] And Mr. Howard made a good representation. He 
[ 3J didn't say that that response to the tender doesn't cover 
[ 4] the tender at all. He said that there were two subjects 
[ 5] covered in that letter. He was never asked what the two 
[ 6] subjects were. Furthermore, it talks to the tender and it 
[ 7] talks about the $320,000 offer. And it also talks about the 
[ 8] lack of the ability to split the water. 
[ 9] Now it is true it doesn't say that I disagree that 
[10] the price you suggested is correct, but it is a matter 
[11] suitable for judicial reckoning and it's also a matter of 
[12] testimony before this Court, judicial recognition. It's a 
[13] matter of testimony before this Court that the availability 
[14] of water has a crucial impact on the price of property. 
[15] Mr. Baldwin certainly, at least by implication, 
[16] objected to the price of that. And as to the terms of the 
[17] tender, the unanimous testimony, including of the plaintiff, 
[18] is that none of those were ever discussed. 
[19] In addition to the points that I've just made, 
[20] every single point that I made in my motion at the close of 
[21] the plaintiffs case also applies to rebut the arguments of 
[22] the plaintiff. 
[23] THE COURT: Now you said you wanted to make a 
[24] motion to dismiss. Just as well make it now. 
[25] DEFENSE MOTION TO DISMISS 
Page 660 
[1 MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor, based on the 
testimony of Mr. Mark Nelson and the evidence produced at 
trial, we move to dismiss the plaintiffs case for failure 
to join the indispensable party, specifically Mr. And Mrs. 
Church. They're indispensable because of the testimony they 
are owners of the water, and the plaintiff is asking the 
Court to deprive the churches of that ownership of that 
water. 
MR. HOWARD: One or two small comments, Your 
Honor. In the first place we did cite the right section of 
the statute. It pertains to tender. All that whole chapter 
pertains to tender and that's why I did it in this fashion. 
Secondly, we never said and intended that it had 
to be surveyed. I've read that over. I can't see where 
that said that. Counsel talks as if that's in the tender 
offer, but it's not. I don't know where we get these 
things. But the point is that we have responded to the 
motion for summary judgment. It's an adequate response and 
totally addresses every issue that's before the Court and I 
repeat, we're entitled, I believe, on the basis of the 
evidence to the ruling of this Court that the plaintiffs 
entitled to specific performance. 
The terms of the contract are adequately 
delineated. There's no question about the property to be 
sold, purchased. Everyone knew what we were talking about, 
Page 661 
[ 1] and the tender was never rejected for any reason. We submit 
[ 2] it, Your Honor. 
[ 3] MR. WILLARDSON: I find in highly ironic. 
[ 4] THE COURT: I find it unusual, but go ahead. Go 
[ 5] ahead. 
[ 6] MR. WILLARDSON: The plaintiff is claiming that 
[ 7] the lay-unrepresented Baldwins are chargeable with knowledge 
[ 8] of latitude and in all arguments of the law. 
[ 9] THE COURT: Now are you gonna argue that? You've 
[10] already argued that once. 
[11] MR. WILLARDSON: Just a moment. On the one point 
[12] they don't know what their own tender is. All the 
[13] requirements of assurance require that survey, and that 
[14] requires a survey. 
[15] THE COURT: Do you want to speak again? 
[16] MR. HOWARD: No. 
[17] COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS 
[18] THE COURT: I appreciate it, folks. 
[19] It's my responsibility to make rulings upon the 
[20] completion of the evidence and that's what I intend to do 
[21] at this time. 
[22] The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. The 
[23] plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict on all the issues 
[24] of fact by clear and convincing evidence on the request for 
[25] a judgment of specific performance is granted. It's my 
Page 662 
[ 1] understanding that I must make finding of fact in order to 
[ 2] justify this order. So I want to make findings of fact at 
[ 3] this time. I will ask both counsel to bring to my attention 
[ 4] any issue that they want a finding on, because I think 
[ 5] under the law, I must make finding of fact 
[6] So I will start doing it and then I'd appreciate 
[ 7] your courtesy in bringing any issue that you want me to make 
[8] a finding on. Now this will be in the finding of fact by 
[ 9] the Court, which I will ask Mr. Howard to prepare, based 
[10] upon the order I'm making at this time. 
[11] The Court finds that Ada Jones and David Baldwin 
[12] and Gloria Baldwin, the parties in this action, entered into 
[13] a lease agreement as set forth in EXHIBIT NO. 1. 
[14] The Court finds that that agreement was modified 
[15] on at least two occasions as the testimony indicates. 
[16J The Court finds that the parties knew the property 
[17] and the description of the property and that the plaintiff 
[18] went into possession, under EXHIBIT NO. 1, that there was 
[19] not a cafe operated on that property when she went into 
[20] possession and that she and another woman by the name of 
[21] Mrs.-
[22] MR. HOWARD: Marilyn Hansen. 
[231 T H E COURT: -Marilyn Hansen went into possession. 
[24] The Court finds that Marilyn Hansen sold her 
[25] interest out to Ada Jones probably approximately in 1985 and 
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[ 1] premises, went to it, and ratified the entry into that 
[ 2] agreement and received the benefits. And it would not be 
[ 3] fair to allow her to say, "Well, I didn't know anything 
[ 4] about it," and get out of it. The Court finds that her 
[ 5] husband, the other defendant, held himself out as being her 
[ 6] agent and the Court finds there was such an agency. 
[ 7] The Court finds that Mrs. Jones was delinquent in 
[ 8] payments through the years at various times and places, but 
( 9] it became a pattern for the parties to accept paid 
[10] delinquencies and for the defendants to accept delinquencies 
[11] and at the time of the tender in May of 1993, that the Ada 
[12] Jones was current in her payments and all of those payments 
[13] had been accepted by the defendants. 
[14] The Court finds that a tender was made in 
[15] conformity with the law, that there was no justification for 
[16] a refusal to comply with the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, and the 
[17] Court finds that the defendants refused to comply with the 
[18] option; and the Court finds that although EXHIBIT NO. 2 is 
[19] ambiguous in places, that the only way it can be construed, 
[20] reading paragraph 3, is that the plaintiff had a right to 
[21] purchase the property to make an option on the property. 
[22] The Court finds that the defendant's refusal to 
[23] appoint an appraiser was an act in breach of this contract 
[24] and left the plaintiff with only the remedy of filing a 
[25] lawsuit, which the plaintiff did. 
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I [ 1] that Ada Jones has been in possession, has operated that 
[ 2] property continuously up until the time she was evicted from 
[3] the premises, which was in—I can't remember now— 
I [ 4] MR. HOWARD: February, 1995. 
[ 5] THE COURT: All right February of 1995. The 
[ 6] Court finds that during that period of time she was in 
[ 7] possession of this property, under EXHIBIT NO. 1, and 
[ 8] thereafter, under EXHIBIT NO. 2, she made improvements in 
( 9] the property. She built up a business on the property. She 
[10] developed a clientele on the property and it was a going 
[11] business. 
[12] The Court finds the parties subsequently entered 
[13] into an agreement, as set forth in EXHIBIT NO. 2, which 
[14] purports to be a lease, also, although it's designated by 
[15] the grant; that Mr. Baldwin is the grantor and Mrs. Jones is 
[16] the grantee. 
[17] The Court finds that in order for understand this 
[18] agreement you must compare it with EXHIBIT NO. 1 and that 
[19] the Court finds that the defendant Mrs. Gloria Baldwin was a 
[20] party to EXHIBIT NO. 1, received the benefits under EXHIBIT 
[21] NO. 1, and that she authorized her husband, the other 
[22] defendant, to enter into an EXHIBIT NO. 2; that she received 
[23] the benefits of EXHIBIT NO. 2 throughout the length of 
[24] EXHIBIT NO. 2; that she used the money that she, at least in 
[25] the summer time, was right next-living right next to the 
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[ 1] The Court finds that based upon the evidence 
[ 2] before the lawsuit, that both sides had an opportunity to 
[ 3] bring appraisers before the lawsuit or before this court to 
[ 4] determine what fair market value of the property was and 
[ 5] the Court finds that the fair market value of the property 
[ 6] is $40,000 and the Court finds in an if I don't accept that, 
[ 7] I would, in essence, defeat the intent of the parties in the 
[ 8] exercising of this contract. So the Court finds that the 
[ 9] $40,000 is a fair market value of this property. 
[10] The Court finds, by the testimony, there's 
[11] taxes in arrears on this property which there's no evidence 
[12] before me, but the Court enters an order of specific 
[13] performance and if there are any taxes on arear, after a 
[14] period of 30 days, then the plaintiff is given the option of 
[15] paying the taxes and it will be credited against the 
[16] purchase price. 
[17] The Court finds further the defendant acknowledged 
[18] by EXHIBIT NO.-
[19] MR. HOWARD: It's 7, isn't it, Your Honor? 6 or 
[20] 7? 
[21] THE COURT: -NO. 6, by a letter dated August 1st, 
[22] 1993, that the plaintiff was to be entitled to a credit of 
[23] $15,036 against the purchase price, and I give her a credit 
[24] on that amount 
[25] The Court finds that-
. M. LiddelL RPR Official Reoorter Sixth Judicial District 
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I [ 1] MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, that was through July 
[ 2] 31st 
[3] THE COURT: I understand. The Court finds that 
[ 4) was through July 31st of 1993. 
[ 5) The Court finds that there are issues of damages 
[6] to go to the jury and these are the issues: 
[ 7] No. 1. Is the plaintiff entitled to any 
[ 8] additional damages for the credits on the agreement from 
[9] July 31st, '93. 
[10] The Court finds there's an issue of damage on 
[11] whether or not Ada Jones should be compensated for the rent 
[12] she had to pay, after she was evicted. The Court finds 
[13] there's an issue of damage on whether she should be 
[14] compensated. 
[15] MR. HOWARD: Would it be for the difference of 
[16] what she would have made against what she did make? 
[17J THE COURT: That's right. If she should be 
[18] compensated for her damages on what she could have made, 
[19] less what she made for the time that she has been 
[20] dispossessed of the premises. 
p i J The Court also reserves the attorney fee issue as 
[22] an additional offset. 
[23] The Court further finds that this agreement and 
[24] option contemplated that there would be water with the 
[25] premises and the plaintiff is awarded a water hookup and 
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( 1] MR. HOWARD: Removal of the tanks? 
[ 2] THE COURT: That's right. 
[ 3] MR. HOWARD: I would think-how long do you say, 
[ 4] counsel? How long will it take you? 
[ 5] MR. WILLARDSON: Well, it's winter. It's the 
[ 6] remote location. That kind of hazardous waste remediation 
[ 7] has to be done by people who are certified by the EPA. 
[8] THE COURT: I just asked for time. 
[ 9J MR. WILLARDSON: I think one year would be 
[10] reasonable. 
[11J MR. HOWARD: I think that's far too long. 
[12] MR. WILLARDSON: They have been in the ground 
[13] since 1968. 
{14] THE COURT: I'll just add it on. There's got to 
[15] be some time given on it. I'll give the defendants an 
[16] opportunity to remove the tanks and place them in the 
[17] condition that it can pass an inspection by July 1st of 
[18] 1996. And the Court reserves the right to grant a judgment, 
[19] if the plaintiff has to pay for that, because the defendants 
[20] haven't done it. 
[21] Now I've gone rapidly, I realize, but I want to 
[22] cover alt facts that you both you want rac to make a finding 
[23] on. 
[24) Do you have anything else? 
[25] MR. HOWARD: Yes, I am willing to survey a new 
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I [ 1 ] h's up to the the defendant to furnish the plaintiff the 
I [ 2] water hookup. If that is not furnished within a period of 
1(3] 30 days, then the plaintiff may obtain their own water 
I [ 4] hookup and the cost of obtaining same will be assessed 
I [ 5] against the purchase price or the plaintiff will be awarded 
I [ 6] judgment for said— 
I [ 7] MR. WILLARDSON: Pardon me. Plaintiff would be 
I [ 8] awarded judgment for what? 
I [ 9] THE COURT: For the cost of the water hookup if 
I [10] the defendants haven't given it to them. I'm sure I said 
I [11] this, but I'm gonna say it again. The Court finds that the 
I [12] language in exhibit NO. 2 is consistent with an option to 
I [13] purchase and is inconsistent with a first right of refusal. 
I [14] And the Court finds there was no offer that even 
I [15] necessitated a right of refusal. 
[16] Oh, further, the Court finds that the defendants 
[17] as owners of the property, have an obligation under the law 
[18] to make the property environmentally safe in conformity with 
[19] their agreement to sell and that if they fail for remove the 
[20] tanks and make the property environmentally safe, then the 
[21] plaintiff may do so and the cost will be assessed against 
[22] the purchase price or the plaintiff will be given a judgment 
[23] for that amount. 
[24] I will set a time. How long do you want me to set 
[25] the time for? 
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[ 1] description, if counsel is opposed to conveying to us a 
[ 2] description that he received. I'm satisfied with the 
[ 3] description he received. I recognize there may be some that 
[4] has been conveyed out to the State of Utah. We would accept 
[5] the difference, but if you want a survey, I'm willing to do 
[6] that. 
[7] MR. WILLARDSON: We don't want to spend any more 
[ 8] money than is necessary. 
[9] THE COURT: All right Um accept the 
[10] description then. 
[11] MR. HOWARD: We'll prepare the description. 
[12] THE COURT: All right. Now this-maybe the 
[13] record should indicate that this court is decreeing this 
[14] decree of specific performance, but I'm decreeing a good 
[15] marketable title. If there are any outstanding liens, 
[16] judgements, debts on the property, they shall be cleared by 
[17] the defendants, or if the plaintiff has to pay funds to 
[18] dear them up, then they should be awarded a judgment for 
[19] the amount she expends. 
[20] MR. HOWARD: In order to get a good marketable 
[21] title, Your Honor, today's market environment, a title 
[22] insurance policy is required. That's how we establish the 
[23] marketable title. That's satisfactory to us. 
[24] MR. WILLARDSON: That's-and there's never been 
[25] any evidence that that's traditionally paid by the seller. 
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[ 1J It can easily be paid by the buyer. 
( 2J THE COURT: Well, I'll solve that right now. 
[ 3] There's nothing in the contracts talks about title 
[ 4] insurance, but there is about the title being good and so 
[ 5] the Court will order title insurance to be placed upon the 
[ 6] property. Each party pay one-half of the cost of the 
[ 7] policy. 
[ 8J MR. HOWARD: All right. 
[9) THE COURT: But all liens should be removed. The 
[10] title should show good marketable title. 
[11] Now it seems to me that I'm missing something, an 
[12] issue on damages, and I can't put my finger on it. So I'm 
[13] gonna reserve the right for take a look at the damage issue 
[14] in the morning when we get together when I prepare the 
[15] proposed instructions. So you both be thinking about that 
[16] and that will give me a chance to think about it, also. 
[17] MR. HOWARD: May Mr. Daynes suggest something to 
[18] you? 
[19] MR. DAYNES: May I suggest a few other findings, 
[20] Your Honor. 
[21] THE COURT: Yes. I was gonna ask that. 
[22] MR. DAYNES: Okay. 
[23] First, one suggestion that I have would be 
[24] regarding the water, that by clear and convincing evidence, 
[25] according to the letter that's been stated where he withdrew 
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[ I ] so, then plaintiff may get a water connection and I'll add 
[ 2] it on to the judgment and I'll put a lien on their water 
[ 3] connection. Well, maybe I can't. Maybe I can't do that. 
[ 4] Well, in the event the defendant fails for get a water 
[ 5] connection, then the water connection that's on the property 
[ 6] at the present time shall be used first for the cafe and 
[ 7] second for the house. 
[ 8) MR. HOWARD: Thank you. 
[ 9] THE COURT: I'll leave that up to the defendants 
[10] to straighten that out. 
[II] MR. WILLARDSON: May we have a finding that the-
[12] THE COURT: Let me just keep here until they're 
[13] through and then I'll come over, counsel. 
[14] MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, let us cogitate 
[15] overnight. We'll come back with a clearer head in the 
[16] morning, if we want to make some-
[17] THE COURT: Additional findings. 
[18] MR. HOWARD: -additional finding. And I would 
[19] suggest we could meet as early as 8:30, if that satisfies 
[20] the Court. 
[21] THE COURT: That's agreeable. 
[22] MR. HOWARD: We can work on this. 
[23] THE COURT: All right. Do you have any other you 
[24] want to bring up at this time? 
[25] MR. HOWARD: Not at this time. 
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I [ 1] his offer because he couldn't provide the water, and also by 
I [ 2] the contracts themselves which both EXHIBIT 1 and EXHIBIT 2 
I [ 3] provided that all water should be paid by Ada Jones, that 
I [ 4] based on that fact and the testimony of the Boulder 
I [ 5] Farmstead Water representative that the water was 
I [ 6] appurtenant and was intended to be appurtenant to the land. 
[7] MR. HOWARD: You want a finding that the water is 
I [ 8] appurtenant. It seems to me, Your Honor-
[ 9] THE COURT: I hesitate to make a finding. 
[10] MR. HOWARD: It would seem to me that furnishing a 
[11] connection to the property by the defendants, aftcr-for 
[12] the furnishing the connection, that if the water company 
[13] takes the position that they can't divide the water, that 
[14] the water connection to the premises to the plaintiffs 
[15] premises shall be remain intact and that the division will 
[16] have to come to the defendant's house until such time as the 
[17] water company is willing to provide a division of the water 
[18] connection. 
[19] THE COURT: Well, the Court makes a finding that 
[20] this water has been used on this cafe for in excess of-
[21] MR. HOWARD: 20 years. 
[22] THE COURT: -20 years, and the Court finds that 
[23] the water shall still be used on the cafe and that there 
[24] will be a water connection available to the cafe and that's 
[25] the responsibility of the defendants. If they fail to do 
Page 673 
[ 1] THE COURT: All right. Do you want me to make 
[2] some findings now? 
[ 3) MR. WILLARDSON: May we have the finding that the 
[ 4] allocation of the water may not all be used by the cafe, but 
[ 5] that some reasonable fraction thereof must be available to 
[ 6] the defendant's house? And I would suggest a finding. 
[ 7] THE COURT: I think I'll go along with that. 
[ 8] I'm-I'm going to make a finding one-half of the water 
[ 9] connection shall be used by the cafe, one half by the house; 
[10] and if the irrigation company doesn't like it, they'll have 
[11] to try and do something about it. 
[12] MR. HOWARD: Okay. 
[13] THE COURT: That's the order. I don't think they 
[14] have the right to terminate the water right, period, 
[15] regardless of what the president says. 
[16] All right? Any other thing you want? 
[17] MR. WILLARDSON: Um, I need some clarification, 
[18] first Could you restate what your first finding, with 
[19] respect to the issue on damages to go to the jury is— 
[20] THE COURT: First, I think there's an issue on the 
[21] amount of credit against it from July 31st of 1993, to the 
[22] present. But there is a whether or not she should be 
[23] allowed any credit for the funds paid since that time. 
[24] The second one is— 
[25] MR. WILLARDSON: The rent paid after eviction. 
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[ 1] THE COURT: Yeah. Should she be entitled to the 
[ 2] amount of rent-
[ 3] MR. HOWARD: She didn't receive. 
[ 4] THE COURT: -she didn't receive from her house, 
! [ 5] because of her eviction. That's the second one. 
[ 6] The third one-oh, the exhibit, the loss, 
[ 7] difference between what she earned and what she could have 
[ 8] had if she had stayed on the premises. 
[ 9] MR. HOWARD: Right. 
[10] THE COURT: Now is there any other? 
[11J MR. HOWARD: No. 
[12] THE COURT: That's what I think. There was 
[13] something else. 
[14] MR. HOWARD: Well I -
[15] THE COURT: I'm not sure there was any evidence on 
[16] to anything else. 
[17] MR. HOWARD: Here we are. This is the exhibit on 
[18] damages, Your Honor. I think that covers the entire amount. 
[19] You reserved the questions of attorneys fees. 
[20] THE COURT: So the loss of earnings, the house 
[21] rental, less loss of earnings, and Dan's market. There are 
[22] three issues that could go to the jury room. I'm reserve a 
[23] right to take a look at that tomorrow when we start 
[24] preparing instructions, if there's anything else. 
[25] MR. HOWARD: All right 
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[ 1] on that. 
[2] THE COURT: That's fine. 
[ 3] THE COURT: So before we start in the morning, if 
[ 4] you've got any additional findings you want me to make, 
[ 5] please submit them to me that. Write them down so I know 
[ 6] what we are talking about. 
[ 7] MR. HOWARD: Okay. 
[ 8) THE COURT: Just make it a memo. 
[ 9] Do you want me to make a particular finding? 
[10] You see, there might be something, Mr. Willardson, 
[11] that you want to make a record on that I've missed, and I'm 
[12] willing to make a finding so you can make your record on it. 
[13] But if I can't think of it now, I'd rather have it all on 
[14] the record. 
[15] MR. WILLARDSON: Okay. 
[16] THE COURT: All right? 
[17] MR. HOWARD: That's fine. 
[18] MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor-
[19] THE COURT: So you'll understand what will happen 
[20] now, what I intend, because I'm making-this is a final 
[21] order that the plaintiff will prepare findings of fact, 
[22] conclusions of law, and an order, based on what I've decided 
[23] at this point, and so this is the time that we should make 
[24] those things. And the only thing I'm sending to the jury is 
[25] on the issue of damages. All right? 
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[ I ] THE COURT: AH right. Does that help? 
[ 2] MR. WILLARDSON: Yes, Your Honor. We request that 
[ 3] all of the issues, with respect to reformation of the 
[ 4] contract, be submitted to the jury. 
[5] THE COURT: Well-
[ 6] MR. WILLARDSON: We request a finding. 
[ [ 7] THE COURT: I don't need a finding. My decree, 
[ 8] what I've already decided, has decided that. So it will not 
[9] go to the jury. I've made these findings of fact. 
[10] MR. WILLARDSON: Just for the record, we're 
[II] requesting finding to be asked the jury as to ail of the 
[12] elements of the plaintiffs case. 
[13] THE COURT: Okay. Well, it's denied. 
[14] MR. WILLARDSON: Also, for the record we're 
[15] objecting to all of the findings that have been made-
[16] THE COURT: Now, counsel, let me just say listen 
[17] to me a minute. I asked you if there are any findings of 
[18] fact you want me to make. You know it's hard enough for a 
[19] Judge to make a ruling, so I don't want to go back and 
[20] rehash this thing. I want you to, if you have some facts 
[21] you want me to find, tell me what they are. I'll tell you 
[22] whether I'm find them or not, because I'm required, under 
[23] the law as I understand it, to make finding of fact. 
[24] MR. WILLARDSON: I'd like the same privilege 
[25] that's been granted to the plaintiff to reserve final answer 
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[ 1] Thank you very much. We'll see you tomorrow 
[ 2] morning at 8:30; all right? 
[ 3] MR. WILLARDSON: May I ask one additional thing? 
[ 4] THE COURT: Surely. 
[5] MR. WILLARDSON: This is an extreme hardship on 
[ 6] light of the Baldwins. They're gonna need every penny they 
[ 7] need. Mr. Baldwin is only authorized to be off work through 
[ 8] today. May they not be present tomorrow? I'm not asking-
[9] THE COURT: I don't have any objection, if they're 
[10] not present, but I think it's a mistake. I can tell you 
[11] this on the record. I think that's a mistake. This jury is 
[12] going to go in there and be asked. And I'm not gonna force 
[13] them to come, but I think it's a mistake if they're not 
[14] here, so that's the only way I can answer that 
[15] MR. WILLARDSON: Thank you Your Honor. 
[16] THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else? We'll be 
[17] in recess till tomorrow morning at 8:30 a.m. 
[18] 
[19] [WHEREUPON THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDINGS WERE 
[20] COMPLETED] 
[21] 
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ADDENDUM 9 
ANNOTATION 
REOUISITE DEFINITENESS OF PRICE TO BE PAID IN EVENT OF 
EXERCISE OF OPTION FOR PURCHASE OF PROPERTY 
§ 1. Scope and related matters: 
[a] Scope, 702 
[b] Related matters, 702 
§ 2. Summary-: 
[a] Generally, 702 
[b] Practice pointers, 703 
§ 3. Specific price, or mode for ascertaining price, provided for in agreement, /03 
§4 Provision containing maximum or minimum price, 706 _ ; _ _ 
8 5 Agreement containing no provision respecting manner of ascertaining price, /UB 
§6. — Pre-emptive right as implying price at which others are willing to buy, 
or at which optionor is willing to sell to others, 710 
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702 PURCHASE OPTION—DEFINITENESS—PRICE 2ALR3d 
§l[a] 2 ALR3d 701 
§ 1. Scope and related matters Validity of sales contract as affected 
r*l Scope ky provision therein giving buyer power 
t is a well-established principle of the 
law of contracts that it is essential to 
to control price to be paid for goods-
49 ALR2d 508. 
die validity of any contract, including Escalator price adjustment clauses, 
an option agreement, that a definite 63 ALR2d 1337. 
price either be stated in the contract or 
be ascertainable from the contract's ex-
press or implied provisions. In this 
Validity and enforceability of contract 
which expressly leaves open for future 
agreement or negotiation the terms of 
annotation it is sought to collect the payment for property, 68 ALR2d 122L 
cases dealing with the problem of 
whether a price provision contained in § 2. Summary 
an option agreement is definite enough rai Generally 
to render the option agreement enforce-
able.1 
In defining the scope of the annota-
tion, the term "option" has not been 
used in a pure or technical sense ex-
clusively, but also in a general or broad 
sense covering rights of "first refusal" 
or "pre-emption," as well as the strict 
"preferred option" right However, 
cases involving an option to purchase at 
a price actually offered to the optionor 
- a third person are not within the scope 
wi this annotation.1 Also excluded are 
cases which deal with options containing 
provisions for the price to be fixed by 
arbitration or appraisal.8 
[b] Related matters 
The time-tested rule of contract law 
that in order for a contract to be en-
forceable it is necessary that the price 
either be specified in the agreement or 
a mode provided whereby the price can 
be definitely ascertained is of course 
applicable to option agreements, and 
such requirement is fulfilled where the 
contractual provision clearly provides 
such definite price or mode of ascertain-
ment.4 Thus, provisions in an option 
agreement which state that the price to 
be paid by the optionee for the property 
shall be the same as that at which the 
optionor offers it for sale to another, 
or that the price to be paid shall be the 
fair market value of the property at the 
Cases discussed in any of the following time the option is exercised, have been 
annotations of related interest which 
also fall within the scope of the present 
annotation are repeated herein: 
Validity and enforceability of provi-
sion for renewal of lease at rental not 
determined 166 ALR 1237. 
Indefiniteness as to terms in option 
for extension or renewal of lease. 172 
ALR 421. 
held definite as to price, and the options 
have been enforced.5 
It has also been held that an option 
to purchase at a price to be agreed 
upon, but not to exceed a specified 
sum, is a definite fixing of the price, and 
such an option may be specifically en-
forced.6 However, in the two cases 
found where the provision in the option 
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement stated a minimum price to be 
contract, option, or provision for re- paid, while leaving the purchase price 
purchase by vendor. 44 ALR2d 342. open to future negotiations, opposing re-
1. The annotation supersedes one in 117 
ALR 1095, except that part of the annotation 
-vhich is covered in 136 ALR 138, as indi-
ated infra, footnote 2. 
2. See the annotation on the subject of an 
option to purchase at a price offered to the 
optionor by a third person, in 136 ALR 
138. 
3. See the annotation on the subject of 
specific performance of a contract or option 
as affected by an unexecuted provision for 
determination of the price by arbitrators or 
appraisers, in 167 ALR 727. 
4. §,3, infra. 
5. §3, infra. 
6. §4, infra. 
2 A L R 3 d PURCK JE OPTION—DEFINTTENESS—PRIC*. 703 
2 ALR3d 701 | 3 
suits were reached under the circum- In the event the contract of one seek-
stances. ing to obtain specific performance of a 
^ On the other hand, option agreements pre-emptive right states no price or mode 
have generally been held unenforceable of ascertaining it, the argument of his 
for lack of definiteness of price if the counsel should be directed to the fre-
parties both fail to provide for a spe- quently recognized theory18 that it is 
cific price to be paid for the property, implied by the mere granting of pre-
and also fail to specify a practicable emptive rights that the price may be 
mode by which the price can be deter- ascertained by reference to what third 
mined with certainty by the court with- parties offer, or what the seller asks on 
out any new expression by the parties the market, and of course he should 
themselves.8 Nevertheless, it has been attempt to show that the optionor did 
held in a few cases that the option place it on the market at a particular 
agreement need not make any mention price at least, if not accept an actual 
of the price to be paid, nor provide offer of a third party at a particular 
for a mode whereby the price can be price. Of course, counsel for the party 
ascertained with certainty, and the op- resisting performance should emphasize 
tion agreement will still be specifically the strictness of the well-established gen-
enforced.9 In some cases, the basis of eral rule that a definite price or means 
such enforcement has been that the of ascertaining it is an essential element 
agreement provided for a pre-emptive of a valid and enforceable option.14 
right which, although granted without 
stating any definite price or mode of * 3- Specific price, or mode for ascer-
ascertaining it, carried an implication taining price, provided for in agree-
that the price to be paid was either the m . e n t 
price which others were willing to pay, Option agreements have generally 
or the price which the optionor was b e e n h e l d or recognized to be sufficiently 
willing to take, and that the agreement d e f i n i t e M t o Pr i ce to justify their en-
was therefore sufficiently definite with forcernent if either a specific price is 
respect to price.10 However, in at least P r o v i d e d f o r ^ the agreement or a 
one case the particular language grant- Practicable mode is provided by which 
ing the pre-emptive right was held not ^ P r i c e c a n b e determined by the 
to carry the implication described above, c o u r t without any new expression by 
and the court refused to enforce the ^ P a r t i e s themselves. 
agreement.11 Cal—Stockwell v Lindeman (1964) 
. . . _ . 229 Gal App 2d —, 40 Gal Rptr 555. 
[b] Practice pointers Conn—Didriksen v Havens (1949) 
The obvious moral for the draftsman 136 Conn 41, 68 A2d 163. 
presented by the cases within the scope HI—Haves v O'Brien (1894) 149 111 
of the present annotation is that if the 403, 37 NE 73, 23 LRA 555; Folsom 
parties desire their option or pre-emptive v Harr (1905) 218 111 369, 75 NE 
agreement to be certainly enforceable, 987. 
the price at which the property may La—Price v Ruston (1931) 171 La 
be purchased should be stated with cer- 985, 132 So 653. 
tainty, or a clear and specific mode of Md—Hagan v Dundore (1945) 185 
ascertaining it should be provided." Md 86, 43 A2d 181, 160 ALR 517; 
Z' I \' P ^ 12. Several examples which have held up 
o c c •!*" " a c t u a l litigation appear in §§ 3 and 4, 
y. § o, intra. infra. 
10. § 6, infra. 13. § g, infra. 
n J K ? 1 1 5 v D a I t o n Motors> Inc- (1961) H. See especially cases in § 5, infra. 260 Minn 124. 109 NW2d 51. infra 5 6. F Y 8 ' 
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Foard v Snider (1954) 205 Md 435, premises at a price not to exceed the 
109 A2d 101: sum of $12,500, and the agreement also 
NH—Kann v Wausau Abrasives Co. stated that the purchase price would 
(1925) 81 NH 535, 129 A 374; R. F. be subject to any amount remaining 
Robinson Co. v Drew (1928) 83 NH due on a $5,000 mortgage on the prem-
459, 144 A 67. ises, it was held in Didriksen v Havens 
NJ—McClung Drug Co. v City (1949) 136 Conn 41, 68 A2d 163, that 
Realty & Invest. Co. (1919) 91 NJ the agreement was not so uncertain as 
Eq 216, 108 A 767, affd 92 NJ Eq to price as to preclude the plaintiff 
237, 111 A 926; Gutch v Meccia (1948) lessee from obtaining specific perform-
142 NJ Eq 430, 60 A2d 649 (recogniz- ance of the option contract The court 
ing rule that it is not necessary that the concluded that since the agreement in 
price be specified in figures or words effect provided that the plaintiff should 
if the contract provides a standard by pay the agreed price less any amount 
which the price may be determined that might be due on the mortgage when 
with certainty). the option was exercised, there was no 
NY—Cortese v Connors (1956) 1 such uncertainty as would violate the 
NY2d 265, 152 NYS2d 265, 135 NE2d statute of frauds, the amount due on 
28. the mortgage would be fixed and defi-
Jurgensen v Morris (1920) 194 App nitely ascertainable, and the provision 
Div 92, 185 NYS 386; Saleh v Karp was within the rule that the essentials 
(1961) 13 App Div 2d 706, 214 NYS of the agreement must be specified in 
2d 472. the contract itself, or that some mode 
Garelik v Rennard (1921) 116 Misc for ascertaining the essentials of the 
352, 190 NYS 371; Brandenburger & agreement must be provided in the 
Marx, Inc. v Heimberg (1942, Mun Ct) contract. 
34 NYS2d 935. An option contract containing Ian-
Ohio—Mose Cohen & Sons, Inc. v guage to the effect that if the party 
Kuhr (1959, CP) 13 Ohio Ops 2d 453, of the second part should desire to 
85 Ohio L Abs 302, 171 NE2d 207, sell the building involved, the party of 
affd (App) 13 Ohio Ops 2d 460, 171 the first part should be given the op-
NE2d 216. tion and preference of purchasing the 
Va—Parker v Murphy (1929) 152 same at the price at which it would 
Va 173, 146 SE 254; Rolfs v Mason be offered, was held in Price v Ruston 
(1961) 202 Va 690, 119 SE2d 238, 2 (1931) 171 La 985, 132 So 653, to be 
ALR3d 695. specifically enforceable. The court was 
W Va—Casto v Cook (1922) 91 W of the opinion that although there was 
Va 209, 112 SE 502. no price specified in the option con-
Wis—Goerke Motor Co. v Lonergan t ract> **« P r i c e w o u l d be ascertained 
(1941) 236 Wis 544, 295 NW 671 ^ ^ certainty when the building was 
(recognizing rule that the failure to offered for sale; and that therefore the 
name a purchase price in an option language of the option contract met the 
agreement does not render the agree- requirement that there be provided in 
ment void for uncertainty and indefinite- **« agreement at least a mode for ascer-
ness if the agreement provides the man- tailing the price with certainty before 
ner by which the price, is to be ascer- a c o u r t m a Y &&** specific performance 
tained or can be determined). o f a n OP*011 contract 
An option granted to plaintiff by a 
Where the lessors, as part of the provision in an agreement establishing 
consideration for a lease, granted to the a partnership at will, whereby the plain-
lessee the option to purchase the leased tiff was to have the first opportunity 
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to buy out the defendant partner's inter- mine, the price to be later determined 
est "for a sum not exceeding the book by outside circumstances, such as in-
value of the share" of the defendant creased costs of production, the base 
partner in the partnership, was held in figure to remain at $45 a ton over the 
Hagan v Dundore (1945) 185 Md 86, whole 5-year period. The court took 
43 A2d 181, 160 ALR 517, to be definite the position that the price was capable 
as to price, and enforceable. The court of judicial ascertainment, and was there-
took the position that the language in fore sufficiently definite to enable the 
effect meant that if the optionor would court to specifically enforce the option 
not accept less than the book value agreement. 
of his interest, he must accept the full i n Cortese v Connors (1956) 1 NY2d 
book value of that interest The court 265, 152 NYS2d 265, 135 NE2d 28, 
concluded that the fact that no date the court held specifically enforceable 
for determining the book value was an option clause in a lease which pro-
provided for in the option agreement
 vided in effect that the lessee was to 
did not make die agreement any less have the first option to purchase the 
certain, because the objecting optionor leased premises, under the terms at 
had his choice of having the book value
 which it should be offered for sale. The 
ascertained at the date of the exercise
 c o u r t w a s apparently of the opinion 
of the option, or at die date die op- that die price was definitely ascertain-
tionee paid die purchase price. able, and would become certain when 
An option agreement whereby the die premises were offered for sale by 
grantor of a certain farm retained the die lessor. 
right to repurchase the farm and the
 I n S a l e h v K a r p ( 1 9 6 1 ) 1 3 A p p Div 
personal property, within 6 months of 2d 706, 214 NYS2d 472, the court held 
die date of sale, for a price correspond- enforceable an option agreement which 
ing to die reasonable evaluation of the
 w a s p a r t 0f a rider attached to a con-
property as determined by the parties,
 t r a c t for fac absolute sale of a number 
based on the consideration paid for the
 0f \ots a t $200 a lot, even though within 
land, plus any and all improvements the option agreement itself there was no 
made by the grantees and all sums ex-
 p r i c e e x p r e s s l y stated for the lots cov-
pended by the grantees for the improve-
 e r e d b y i t j w h e r e the agreement con-
ment of the stock and farming equip- t ^ g d
 a provision which contemplated 
ment, was held by the court in Foard that a further contract was to be made 
v Snider (1954) 205 Md 435, 109 jf ^
 o p t i o n w a s exerciSed, the provi-
A2d 101, to be specifically enforceable.
 s i o n a k o s t a t i n g t h a t s u c h c o n t r a c t 
The court took the position that al- "shaU be in identical form as the within 
though there was no price stated in contract" The court took the position 
the option agreement, the computation that the effect of diese provisions was 
of the price was a matter of mere
 to incorporate into the option part of 
mathematics, and tiierefore, tiiat the the contract die $200-a-lot price con-
pnce was definitely ascertainable and tained in the other parts of the contract, 
the option contract specifically enforce- ^d accordingly the option agreement 
able
* was held to be complete and enforceable 
In Kann v Wausau Abrasives Co. by the court. 
(1925) 81 NH 535, 129 A 374, the The
 COUrt in Mose Cohen & Sons, 
court held valid and enforceable a 5-year l n c . v Kuhr (1959, CP) 13 Ohio Ops 
option agreement whereby die optionee 2d 453, 85 Ohio L Abs 302, 171 NE2d 
was given die right to purchase die 207, affd (App) 13 Ohio Ops 2d 460, 
excessive output of die optionor's garnet 171 NE2d 216, stated tiiat an option 
[2 ALR3dJ—45 
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contract in which the corporate defend- a sufEciently definite price to permit 
ants granted to the plaintiff the right enforcement of the agreement 
for 5 years to purchase from the d o Where an option clause m a kase 
ndants any or all sheet iron purchased provided that the lessee had a right 
bv defendants, at the market value then to purchase the building at any time 
prevailing in the Cincinnati market, was during the term at a price not to 
not inval i on the ground of uncertainty, exceed $2 5 0 0 i t wasJyk m Trotter 
because a fixed price could be deter- v Lewis (1946) 185 Md 528, 45 Ajd 
mined by the parties to the option 329, that the price provision was not 
contract The court was of the opinion invalid as indefinite and lacking in mu-. 
that the fact that the market value tuality, since it was to become binding 
snisht fluctuate each day or each week on both parties when the optionee ex-
S d not mean that the sheet iron did ercised the option. The court concluded 
not have a determinable fair market ^ ^ ^ t ^ ^ X 
l e d f i c performance of an option clause 7, 113 NW 779, the court held that 
n a \cL which provided that if the an option contract which gave the 
w « l moDertv should be offered for lessee an option to purchase at a price 
S S t S S k S at any time during not to exceed $75 an acre was no, 
the lJase the lessee should have the uncertain as to the price to be paid 
? • n ^ r t u m t v to buy the property for the land, and the option contract 
2 " the^pricf and t * £ at which it was specifically enforced by the court. 
L S beP offerS to others. The court The court concluded that under Hie 
f
 nnn\r7ntiTsatisfied that the Ian- contract terms fixing a maximum price 
Tmode by which the price for the of the lessee to purchase upon payment 
property could be ascertained with of that amount. 
S a i n i An option providing that the optionee 
7
* + would have the right to purchase cer-
However, in Sharkey vLarkins (1873) tain property at a price to be agreed 
S2 OT623 the court, although deem- upon, but not to exceed the sum of 
L ^ u n T e c e ^ to answer the ques- $16,500, was held in Kastens v Ruland 
S i whSher £ option clause in a (1923) 94 NJ Eq 451, 120 A 21, not 
1 . TiTtinT in effect that the lessee so vague and indefinite as not to sup-
M W a rieht to purchase the port specific performance, notwithstmd-
r m t s e ^ d u r i n g l e termPof the lease ing * a t the contract contemplated 
??TTm t^be determined by the value entering into another and more definite 
the certainty of the price provisi ^ ^ ^ ^
 i n a n option clause 
S 4 Provision containing maximum or
 i n a l e a s e stating that the lessee should 
' nunimum price have the privilege of purchasing the 
An option to purchase at a price to be leased premises for a price not to ex-
J « d J £ n out not to exceed a speci- ceed $3,000 at any time during the 
^ f u n f h ^ b l e n held to provide for term of his lease was suff ioen^ defi-
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nite as to the price to be paid for of some other person. The court con-
the premises should the lessee desire eluded that although it was true that 
to exercise the option, and was there- the purchase price was not specified 
fore specifically enforceable. The court in the contract in the first instance, the 
took the position that even though the contract did appoint a mode for de-
agreement stated that the purchase price termining the price, and the price was 
was not to exceed $3,000, the lessee had determined according to that mode, that 
an absolute right to specific perform- is, the lessees agreeing to purchase the 
ance of the agreement by offering ex- property at the price fixed by the lessor, 
actly $3,000 for the property.
 ancj that therefore the contract was per-
In Crotts v Thomas (1946) 226 NC feet and complete in all respects, as 
385, 38 SE2d 158, the court granted if the purchase price had been orig-
specific performance of an option clause inally fixed in the writing. See also 
in a lease which stated that the lessee Didriksen v Havens (1949) 136 Conn 
should have a right to purchase the
 4 1 j 68 A2d 163, supra §3, reaching 
leased property if it was offered for ^
 s a m e r e s u l t 
sale at any time during the 10-year 
term, at a price to be agreed upon, 
which price in no event should be more I n ^ t w o following cases the courts 
than $150 per acre. The court took ^ve arrived at different results on the 
the position that an option to purchase problem of whether a price provision 
at a price to be agreed upon, but not m a n option agreement which states a 
to exceed a stated sum, is definite and minimum price to be paid, while leaving 
certain as to the price provision, and *he purchase price open to future nego-
will be specifically enforced by a court tiations, is definite enough as to price 
of equity. The court concluded that to be enforceable. 
the optionee could exercise the option In Purdy v Carlson (1953) 118 Cal 
at the stated maximum price without App 2d 526, 258 P2d 94, the court 
any further negotiations with the op- stated that a clause in a lease provid-
tionor in regard to the price to be paid ing that the lessee was to have the 
for the premises. first option to purchase the premises at 
An option clause in a lease stating a price of not less than $20,000, did 
in effect that the lessees were to have not fix any definite price to be paid 
the first privilege of buying the leased in the event of the exercise of the 
premises on terms to be agreed upon option, and that therefore such an op-
at the time such agreement was made, tion clause, standing alone, was unen-
the purchase price not to exceed $15,000, forceable. 
was held by the court in Parker v However, in Hunter v Farrell (1913) 
Murphy (1929) 152 Va 173, 146 SE 42 New Br 323, 14 DLR 556, 13 East 
254, to be -definite and certain as to LR 354, the court denied the defend-
the purchase price and specifically en- ant's contention that the price provision 
forceable. The court construed the Ian- in an option agreement that the op-
guage in the option clause to mean that tionee should have the option of buying 
in the event the lessor decided to sell the building for not less than $10,000 
his property at any time within the was too indefinite and uncertain as to 
term of the lease, the lessees should price to be specifically enforceable, and 
have the first right to buy it at the construed the language in the option 
price the lessor was willing to take from agreement to mean that the optionee 
anyone else, whether the price was fixed , had a right to exercise the option for 
by the lessor himself, or by the offer exactly $10,000. 
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; 5. Agreement containing no provision the land for sale, he would afford the 
sspcctlng manner of ascertaining lessee the first opportunity to buy. The 
price parties did not agree upon a specific 
It is a generally recognized rule that price for the property involved, nor 
t an option agreement neither contains did they provide for a mode whereby 
L provision specifying the price, nor the price could be ascertained with cer-
>rovides for a mode whereby the price tainty, and the court concluded there-
i n be ascertained with certainty, other fore that since the contract was indefi-
han the future agreement of the par- nite with respect to the price to be paid 
ies, enforcement of the option contract for the land it could not be specifically 
hould be denied on the ground that it enforced. 
s indefinite and uncertain as to price. In Fogg v Price (1888) 145 Mass 513, 
!n the following cases this principle was 14 NE 741, the court denied specific 
tpplicd in various circumstances. performance of a covenant in a lease 
Where the option clause in a lease which provided only that if the prem-
Drovidcd in effect that should the lessor ises were for sale at any time, the lessee 
lecide to sell the leased premises, the should have the first refusal. The court 
essee was to have the first chance to took the position that since the option 
3uy the property, the court in Folsom clause in the lease neither fixed the 
/ Harr (1905) 218 111 369, 75 NE 987, price, nor provided any way in which 
leld that the plaintiff lessee was not the price could be fixed, the contract 
mtitled to specific performance of the must fail for indefiniteness. But see 
option clause, on the ground that no Shayeb v Holland (1947) 321 Mass 429, 
?-' - was stated nor was any method 73 NE2d 731, infra, reaching an op-
Di ascertaining the price fixed in the posite result 
[ease, and therefore the option clause Relying on the rule that an option 
*-as too uncertain to be specifically ^
 a l e a s e t o p u r chase is unenforceable 
enforced. The court took the position
 w h e r e t h e r e i s neither a price specified, 
that it is not necessary that the contract
 n o r a standard established by which the 
should determine the price in the first
 p r i c e may be determined with certainty, 
instance, but it is necessary that it at ^
 c o u r t i n McClung Drug Co. v City 
least provide a way by which the price Realty & Invest. Co. (1919) 91 NJ 
can thereafter be determined, in which
 E q 216, 108 A 767, affd 92 NJ Eq 237, 
case the contract would be perfected
 m A 9 2 6 , held that the lessee was 
only when the price had been so
 n o t entitled to a specific performance 
determined. of
 a n option clause in a lease which 
In Hayes v O'Brien (1894) 149 HI stated in effect that if the lessor de-
<103, 37 NE 73, 23 LRA 555, the rule cided to place the leased property on 
was recognized that the price is an the market for sale, then the lessee 
essential ingredient in an option con- would be given 30 days' notice in writ-
tract, and where there is neither a ing of such intention, with the privilege 
specific price provided for in the con- of purchasing the property within 30 
tract nor a mode provided by which days. The court took the position that 
the price can be ascertained with cer- although it is not necessary that the 
tainty, the contract is void for incom- price be specified in figures or words, 
r^teness and incapable of enforcement, it is necessary that a standard at least 
*n Wolf v Lodge (1913) 159 Iowa be established by which a price may 
162, 140 NW 429, the court denied spe- be determined with certainty, as for 
cific performance of an option clause instance, language stating that the op-
in a lease in which the lessor stated tionee would have the first chance to 
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another party, or language stating that The court in Smoyer v Roth (1888, 
the price will be settled by an appraisal Pa) 10 Sadler 32, 13 A 191, 11 Cent 
or by arbitration. 779, held that an option clause in a 
An option clause in a lease providing lease providing in effect that the lessee 
only that the lessee should have the would have first chance to purchase the 
first option to purchase the leased prem- premises at a price agreed upon in the 
ises if the lessor decided to sell was held future was indefinite as to the price to 
unenforceable in Andreula v Slovak be paid for the premises, and therefore 
Gymnastic Union Sokol Assembly No. unenforceable. 
223 (1947) 140 NJ Eq 171, 53 A2d 191, The court in Driebe v Ft. Penn Realty 
on the ground that there was neither Co. (1938) 331 Pa 314, 200 A 62, 117 
a specific price provided for in the op- ALR 1091, recognized that a provision 
tion clause, nor was there any criterion in an option contract stating that the 
or standard established by which the lessee shall have the first chance to pur-
price could be determined with certainty, chase the property at a price to be agreed 
In Colcott v Sutherland (1932) 36 upon by the parties is too vague and 
NM 370, 16 P2d 399, it was pointed indefinite to support a decree of specific 
out in a dictum that if there is no performance. 
price indicated in an option clause to In Rolfs v Mason (1961) 202 Va 
repurchase certain property, a court of 690, 119 SE2d 238, 2 ALR3d 695, the 
equity will not hold that the parties court held that the plaintiff purchaser 
are to be bound by a rcasonable^grice, was not entitled to specific performance 
and will not specifically enforce the of an option clause which stated only 
option contract. that if the owner should sell the two 
The court in Brandenburger & Marx, lots adjoining the tract which the pur-
ine v Heimberg (1942, Mun Ct NY) chaser had just bought from the owner, 
34 NYS2d 935, held indefinite and un- then the purchaser would have first 
enforceable an option clause in a lease choice at purchasing the adjoining lots, 
providing that the tenant was to have The court took the position that the 
the privilege to purchase the leased option clause of the contract neither 
premises at any time within the life contained a specific price, nor provided 
of the lease, for a sum to be fixed when for a mode whereby the price could be 
the option was exercised. The court, ascertained with certainty. Thus, the 
in arriving at its decision, was appar- court concluded, there was no agree-
ently guided by the rule that an option ment of the parties on the essential ele-
agreement must either specify the price ment of price, and therefore the actions 
to be paid or provide a mode whereby of the parties did not result in a full 
the price can be ascertained with and complete agreement 
certainty. An option agreement to repurchase, 
Where an option clause in a lease making no mention of price, but merely 
stated that the lessee might, at his op- providing that the vendor reserved to 
tion, purchase the leased premises at himself the right of first option to re-
a price satisfactory to the lessor, the purchase the buildings at such time as 
court, in Re McVoy's Estate (1950, Sup) the vendee should dispose of them, was 
94 NYS2d 396, affd 276 App Div 1102, held unenforceable in Machesky v Mil-
96 NYS2d 686, held that such a price waukee (1934) 214 Wis 411, 253 NW 
provision was merely an agreement to 169, on the ground that it neither pro-
agree upon a price in the future, and vided that the price was to be some 
was therefore too indefinite as to the specified or reasonable amount, nor pro-
price to be paid for the premises to be vided any manner by which the price 
enforceable. was to be ascertained or determined. 
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The court took the position that at best price at which the optionor is willing 
the option agreement was nothing more to sell, was the price intended, and 
tr an agreement to make a future whether, therefore, the requisite definite-
ag*wement as to an essential term which ness was established.14 
cannot be supplied by implication of The court in Brenner v Duncan 
law, and that because there had been no (1947) 313 Mich 1, 27 NW2d 320 de-
meeting of the minds as to the price to nied the defendant lessor's contention 
be paid for the premises, the contract that the option clause in a lease which 
could be given no effect provided in effect that the lessees would 
• be given first preference, and allowed to 
In the following case, however, the purchase the leased premises if the par-
court granted specific performance of ties could agree on the price, was void 
an option agreement even though there under the statute of frauds and unen-
was neither a specific price provided forceable for vagueness. The court took 
for in the agreement nor a mode pro- the position that the terms of the lease 
vided by which a price could be ascer- imposed upon the lessor a duty, before 
tained with certainty. selling to any other purchaser, to fix a 
The court in Shayeb v Holland specific sum as the amount at which she 
(1947) 321 Mass 429, 73 NE2d 731, would be willing to sell the premises in 
granted plaintiff lessee's bill for specific question, and to afford the plaintiff 
performance of a paragraph in a lease lessees an opportunity to buy the same 
which provided in effect that the lessee a t such figure. 
at his option should be entitled to the In Barling v Horn (1956, Mo) 296 
privilege of purchasing the leased prem- SW2d 94, the court granted specific 
b no mention being made of the price performance of a clause in a lease where-
to je paid by the purchaser, on the by the lessees were to have the first 
ground that although the parties never opportunity to purchase the premises if 
agreed upon any definite price or made the lessor decided to sell prior to the 
any attempt to do so, and never agreed expiration of the lease, even though the 
upon any specific method for fixing a lease did not stipulate a price or provide 
price, the option to sell should be rea- for terms under which a price could be 
sonably understood to be an offer to agreed upon by the parties. The court 
sell for a fair and reasonable price. JJu£_ was of the opinion that the clause in the 
see. Fogg v Price (1888) 145 Mass 513, lease was not an option to purchase in 
14 NE 741, supra, reacWng^opposite
 a true sense, but was rather a grant of 
^Lj^ a ri§ht of pre-emption, whereby the 
t 6. -Pre-emptive right as implying ^ w f obl igated if he decided to sell 
price at which others are willing to ]fe l a n d a t d 1 ' t o give the lessees the 
buy, or at which optionor is willing first opportunity to purchase at the price 
to sell to others a n d . o n &* t e r m s that the lessor was 
A number of cases have been specifi- ^ h n g to sell to another, 
cally concerned with the problem The court in R. F. Robinson Co. v 
whether a grant of a pre-emptive right Drew (1928) 83 NH 459, 144 A 67, 
without specification of the price or interpreted an option clause in a lease 
designation of a mode of ascertaining it to the effect that if the lessor decided 
carries the implication that the price at to sell the leased property, the lessee 
± others are willing to buy, or the should have the preference as a pur-
15. For an example of a case where the Connors (1956) 1 NY2d 265, 152 NYS2d 
price offered to others is the expressed mode 265, 135 NE2d 28, supra § 3 . ' 
for ascertaining the price, see Cortese v 
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chaser, to mean that the lessee should 
have the refusal of the property at such 
price as the lessor asked, and granted 
specific performance of the option clause. 
The court, in arriving at its decision 
that the language in the option agree-
ment implied that the optionee was to 
have the first right to purchase at the 
price the optionor was asking for the 
property, pointed out that the price in 
the end was to be determined by the 
optionor's decision, and therefore, that 
the price was definite and ascertainable. 
In Jurgensen v Morris (1920) 194 
App Div 92, 185 NYS 386, where an 
option clause in a lease contained no 
mention of a specific price to be paid 
by the optionee, but merely provided 
that if the lessor desired to sell the 
leased property before the expiration of 
the lease, then the lessee should have 
the first option to purchase, the court 
held that the language implied that the 
lessee was to be given the opportunity 
to buy the property upon the terms of 
an acceptable offer by a third party to 
the lessor, and therefore the price was 
definitely ascertainable and the option 
clause in the lease specifically enforce-
able. 
Language in a lease covenant to the 
effect that in the event that the lessor 
should decide to sell the leased premises 
during the lessee's term, the lessee should 
have the preference over the other par-
ties, provided that the lessor and lessee 
could agree upon a price and terms of 
sale, was held in Garelik v Rennard 
(1921) 116 Misc 352, 190 NYS 371, 
to be definite as to the price terms, and 
valid and enforceable. Apparently the 
lessor's fixing of a specific price for which 
he would sell to the plaintiffs assignor 
was the factor that led the court to hold 
the pre-emptive agreement definite as 
to price, and enforceable. 
However, in King v Dalton Motors, 
•EFINTTENESW —PRICE 711 
d 701 § 6 
LOG (1961) 260 Minn 124, 109 NW2d 
51, the court held that an option clause 
in a lease stating in effect that the lessor 
would give the lessee the first option to 
purchase the leased premises at a price 
to be negotiated and to be agreed upon 
between the parties at the time of sale 
provided no standard for ascertaining 
the price, and was therefore fatally un-
certain and unenforceable. Although 
the court recognized that unless the con-
text of the option agreement indicates 
otherwise, the use of "first option to 
buy" or a similar expression imports a 
preferential right on the part of the 
lessee to purchase the leased premises 
at the same price and upon the same 
terms as contained in any bona fide 
offer from a third person acceptable to 
the lessor, the court said that in the 
instant case the phrase "first option to 
purchase" was not used in its ordinary 
sense so as to give the lessee the right 
to purchase the property at the same 
price offered by a third party, but on 
the contrary, the parties specifically 
provided that the price was to be nego-
tiated and to be agreed upon between 
them at the time of sale, such a provi-
sion providing no standard for ascer-
taining the price. Although the court 
recognized that there were a few cases 
in which the courts had enforced an 
option agreement where the parties in-
dicated that the terms of the purchase 
were to be agreed upon in the future, 
the court concluded that these cases 
were neither persuasive nor in accord-
ance with the great weight of authority.16 
There are a number of cases in § 5, 
supra, reaching the same result as the 
Dalton Case (Minn) supra, in similar 
circumstances, but in which the ap-
proach taken or considered by the cases 
in the present section was not discussed. 
J. R. HARVEY. 
16. See, for example, Brenner v Duncan 
(1947) 318 Mich 1, 27 NW2d 320, supra. 
Consult POCKET PARTS for later case service 
contract authorizing architect to permit and for 
cilitate inspection of work by owner and his 
agents, to stop work if necessary to insure its 
proper execution, and to make decisions on all 
claims of owner or contractor and on all other 
matters relating to execution of work or inter-
pretation of contract, and provisions charging 
architect with responsibility for furnishing 
additional instructions necessary for proper ex-
ecution of work, and empowering architect to 
issue certificates for payment to contractor for" 
such amount as architect derided to be properly 
due, did not bestow authority on architect to 
make changes in work without approval of 
owner, where contract specifically provided that 
changes ordered by owner must be in writing!' 
Kirk Reid Co. v Fine. 205 Va 778. 139 SE2d 
829. 
§ 30 [2 ALR3d 689] 
Contract prevailed, and contractor was not 
entitled to compensation for extra work, where 
contractor merely obtained approval of engi-
neer, who was employee of owner's architect, 
whereas contract expressly limited architect's 
authority, and required orders for extras to be 
signed by owner, or to be authorized by archi-
tect's statement that owner had approved such 
work. Citizens Nat. Bank v L L Glascock, Inc. 
(Miss) 243 So 2d 67. 
See W. E. Garrison Grading Co. v Piracci 
Const. Co. Inc., .27 NC App 725, 221 SE2d 512, 
§9 . 
2 ALR3d 701-711 
New sections and subsections added: 
§ 7* Other provisions 
§1 [2ALR3d702] 
[b] Related matters 
17 Am JUT 2d,'Contracts § 82; 71 Am j u r 2d, 
Specific Performance §§ 37-39; 77 Am Jur 2d, 
Vendor and Purchaser § 33. 
Option to purchase real property as affected 
by optionor's receipt of offer for, or sale of, 
larger tract which includes the optioned parcel. 
34 ALR4th 1217. 
Sufficiency as to method of giving oral or 
written notice exercising option to renew or 
extend lease. 29 ALR4th 903. 
Specific performance of sale of goods tinder 
UCC sec. 2-7L6.26 ALR4th 294. 
Determination of price under testamentary 
option to buy real estate. 13 ALR4th 947. 
Construction and application of UCC § 2-305 
dealing with open price term contracts. 91 
ALR3d 1237. 
Timeliness of notice- of exercise of option to 
purchase realty. 87 ALR3d 805. 
^Requirements as to certainty and complete-
ness of terms of lease in agreement to lease. 85 
ALR3d414. 
Equipment leases as security interest within 
Uniform Commercial Code sec. 1-201(37). 76 
ALR3d 11. 
Lessee's first privilege option to purchase or 
terms of similar import as requiring existence 
of prior offer from third party. 76 ALR3d 1139. 
Necessity for payment* or tender of purchase 
money within option period in order to exercise 
option, in absence of specific time requirement 
for payment. 71 ALR3d 1201.\ 
Landlord and tenant: What amounts to "sale" 
of property for purposes of provision giving 
tenant right of first refusal if landlord desires to 
sell. 70 ALR3d 203, 
Sufficiency of consideration For employee 
stock-option contract. 57 ALR3d 1241. 
^Specific performance of land contract notwith-
standing, failure of vendee to make required 
payments on time. 55 ALR3d 10. 
'• Construction and. application of "first refusal*' 
option contained in trust instrument and relat-
ing to sale, of shares of stock. 51 ALR3d 1327. 
t Landlord and Tenant: tenant's rights under 
provision giving him pre-emptive right to 
purchase on terms offered by third person, 
where third person's offer is withdrawn before 
tenant exercises pre-emptive right. 46 ALR3d 
1377. 
"Validi ty of option to purchase realty as 
affected by indefiniteness of term provided for 
exercise. 31 ALR3d 522. 
Holding over under lease, or renewal or 
extension thereof, as extending time for exercise 
of option to purchase contained therein. 15 
ALR3d470. 
^Tenant's rights under unexercised option to 
purchase as affected by landlord's breach of 
lease or lease agreement. 12 ALR3d 1128. 
. i: 22 Am Jur PI 8c Pr Forms (Rev), A n s w e r -
defense-—contract not enforceable because of 
uncertainty of price, Form 18.. 
24 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Complaint, 
petition, or declaration—breach of option to 
purchase—fixed purchase price, Form 36. 
9 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 495, Payment 
Made for Unexercised Option To Purchase 
Rather than as DownPayment. 
15 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 583, Timeliness 
o f optionee's notice to exercise option to 
purchase real property. 
19 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d 543, Real Prop-
75 
* A -
erty Contracts—Specific Performance with 
Abatement of Purchase Price. .V: AI?v. 
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[2ALR3d703] 
holding or recognizing option agree-
ments to be sufficiendy definite as to price to 
justify their enforcement if either.specific price 
is provided for in agreement or practicable 
mode is provided by which 'price can be deter-
mined by court without any new expression by 
pames themselves: ..^, \ , - ..*«.••",•* 
A r i z ^ D a i e T ^ (1981, App) 131 Ariz 
182, 639 P2d 372. "!^,;;.'.. ;;- :.;;: . ; ; ; ' ; ; " " ' , 
;Ga—Beller & Gould v tinsenby (1980) 246* 
Ga 15, 268 SE2d 611. ' "
 v ' > • ; • ' •;: ','•."... 
% Tex—Moore v Dodge (1980, Tex Civ App 8th 
Dist) 603 SW2d 236 writ refn r e . /;; '_, .',; 
Lease giving lessee option to purchase prop-
erty at "fair market value" was specific enough 
to be specifically enforceable since fair market 
value is well-established means of property 
evaluation, its determination is common task 
performed by courts on a daily basis, and does 
not require further agreement of parties. <5ood-
west Rubber Corp. v Munoz (1985, 4th Dist) 
170 Cal App 3d 919, 216 Cal Rptr 604.. 'tlf.,, 
:In action by lessee for specific performance 
of option to purchase real property in which 
parties could not agree upon option price, trial 
court properly ruled that correct price was pres-
ent value of fee unencumbered by lease where 
lease provision granted lessee option to pur-
chase "fee tide," which term clearly stated what 
interest lessee would purchase upon exercising 
option, and lessor's expert witness testified that 
value of fee title unencumbered by lease was 
$1,684,000. Lassiter v Kaufman (1991, Fla) 581 
So 2d 147, 16 FLW S398. *' ' ' ' ~ 
". Where purchase option in lease contained 
specific purchase price, and where only uncer-
tainty regarding financing arrangements arose 
when lessees offered to pay purchase price in 
cash or to make whatever other financial ar-
rangements would prove most beneficial to 
lessors, option contract was not too indefinite, 
for failure to spell out financing terms, to be 
specifically enforced. Ford v Lord Q978) 99 
Idaho 580, 586 P2d 270. 
i\^f*V//% Lease provision giving lessee .option to pur-
5 K v J chase- premises at any time during lease for 
JL- v j "then prevailing market price" was sufficiently 
•^  ^1 certain as to purchase price, and option agree-
\^-\^ / ment could be specifically enforced. Miller v 
,&J*\ ' Bloomberg, 26 111 App 3d 18, 324 NE2d 207 
** ur^l (citing annotation). 
T I 76 • 
- In action brought by corporation agai 
lending institution for specific performance < 
damages for alleged breach of contract for t 
construction management services* where con-
tract contained option to buy subject real estate 
at 80 percent of market value appraisal accej^J 
aWe^job^thjg^nies, specific performance was 
pfo^erly^Emea^oh basis ot uncertainty of 
option price. Foster Enterprises, Inc. v Germa-
n s Federal Sav. & Loan Asso: (1981 111 App)" 
421 NE2d 1375. ' J ^ ^ ^ V ^ , V , / . - . - O - V c *• 
Heirs of original lessor, could not avoid, 
obligation under contract, notwithstanding fact 
that in letter purporting to exercise optionj* 
lessor mistakenly included incorrect purchase 
price* where exercise of option at price provided 
for in lease was made clearly and unequivocally 
by lessee, so that recitation of exact terms of 
agreement was not necessary. Rowland v Amoco 
Oil Co. (1982s Ind App) 432 NE2d 414. 
Option to purchase at a specific price was not 
void for failing to specify terms of payment; 
when a contract specifies no terms for payment 
it means fiill payment in cash. Ailstock v 
Hamiter (1982, La App) 420 So 2d 500. 
'Where it wai* provided in lease that within 
120 days after commencement of term of lease 
landlord would'deliver to tenant statement in 
writing setting forth actual cost of land, entire 
building, and improvements, and that tenant 
would have option to purchase property at 112 
percent of aforestated actual cost if exercised 5 
years after commencement of lease, or at 110 
percent of actual cost if exercised 10 years after 
commencement of lease, and where landlord 
thereupon furnished tenant with cost sheet 
showing that jotal cost,came-to $98,900, to 
which tenant replied that he was shocked at 
amount and considered sum to be highly exor-
bitant, and where controversy was still unsettled 
at time landlord sold property and assigned 
lease to defendants* who stated they would 
honor option only at previously forwarded cost 
figures, trial court did not abuse discretion in 
arriving at figure.of $75,000 as cost of property 
for purposes of exercising option, where it 
appeared that such figure was arrived at by 
splittirig; difference of tenant's and defendant's 
views of what cost actually was, or by relying 
upon revenue stamps arid title Insurance in 
connection with* conveyance of property, and 
such.discretion was particularly proper in view 
of fact that landlord-assignor had either mislaid 
or destroyed all pertinent records and was 
therefore^ unable to prove, actual cost of con-
structionf However, $75,000 judgment should 
be modified in view of provision of option that 
purchase price would be 112 gercent of actual 
cost, and such modification would be accom-
plished by adding 12 percent of ascertained cost 
to cost itself. Shaya v Stein, 42 Mich App 91 , 
201 NW2d 273. 
In action in which grantee of option to 
\ 
Ur 
purchase real property sought specific perfor-
mance of contract, in which option parties 
agreed that purchase price would oe either sum 
ottered by bona fide third-party purchaser or 
price fixed by three appraisers, trial court 
properly granted judgment for option grantee, 
despite defendant seller's contention that 
option was indefinite and unenforceable because* 
•it did not specify how appraisers were to deter-
mine amount of purchase price, where parties 
\ intended to commit calculation of price to third 
party and to be bound by result; that agreement 
provided objective standard that rendered . 
option definite and enforceable. Tonkery vi 
Martina (1991) 78 NY2d 893, 573 NYS2d 450. 
577 NE2d 1042.. 
In action for specific performance by "grantee" 
of option to purchase land owned by defendant 
at price "equal to that offered by any bona fide 
third party purchaser"'or price to be determined 
by appraisal method1, trial court properly' 
granted specific performance where parties 
obviously intended that purchase price would 
have been fair market value of parcel as estab-
lished by either bona fide purchase offer or by 
appraiser, so in either event, purchase price 
would have been "the end product of agreement 
between the ;paro^ thems^gs r > r in absence of 
otter TjyTSona fide"tK^ purchaser, and 
upon failure of appraisers selected by parties to 
agree upon third appraiser in accordance with 
contract, court, in order to carry out intention^ 
of parties, had authority to make finding of fair 
market value. Tonkery v Martina (1990, 4th 
Dept) 167 App Div 2d 860, 562 NYS2d 895, 
app gr 77,NY2d 804, 568 NYS2d 912, 571 
NE2d 82 and affd 78 NY2d 893, 573 NYS2d 
450, 577 NE2d 1042. 
Option agreement which provided that pur-
chase price for property would be $14,000, less 
sum paid for option.and any extensions or 
renewals thereof, and that purchase price >vas 
to be paid in installments, $700 for reimbursing 
June payment, $5,200 to purchase option, 
$5,600 cash at time of closing, and $2,500 upon 
sale of 15 acres of zoned apartment land, was 
sufficiently definite as to purchase price and 
time for payment to satisfy statute of frauds. 
Craig v Kessing (1978) 36 NC App 389, 244 
SE2d 721. 
Lessee** option to purcnase at "current mar-
ket value at the end of the final term," contem-
plated fair market value and met necessary stan-
dards for certainty of price. Portnoy v Brown^ 
430 Pa 401, 243 A2d 444. 
8 4 [2ALR3d706] 
Option to purchase at price consistent with 
any other offer, but not less than $750 per acre; 
was sufficiently "definite to satisfy statute of 
frauds. Foster v Bullard (Tex Civ App) 496 
SW2d 724, error ref n r e. : *
 ;— .^  
)/«)« 
H rtzat" §5 [2 ALR3d 708] 
Conditional agreement of purchase and sale 
reciting that purchase price is to be a given 
amount per square foot, resulting in total 
purchase price of $16,470, owner to receive 
$2,800 cash above real-estate commission of 10 
percent, balance of purchase money payable 
$100 per month/at 6 percent interest "due in 
full in five years" was too ambiguous to be 
specifically enforceable, on ground that it could 
not be determined when interest was to be paid, 
or whether amount to be paid per month on 
balance included interest. Silverman v Kogok, 
239 Md 71,210 A2d 375. 
§ 6 [2ALR3d710] 
- In action by lessee for specific performance 
of preemptive right to purchase real property, 
trial court erred in finding preemptive right 
clause in lease so uncertain as to render it 
unenforceable, since preemptive rights are 
unenforceable under certain circumstances, 
notwithstanding absence of specific terms 
regarding price, method of acceptance, or time 
of acceptance; missing terms are "fixed" by the 
lessor's acceptance of bona fide third-party 
offer. Polemi v Wells (1988, Colo App) 759 P2d 
796. 
Failure of written memorandum stating pur-
chase price is sufficient to require denial of 
request for specific performance/Thus, trial 
court properly refused to" order specific perfor-' 
mance of real estate lease and option to pur-' 
chase agreement where there was complete 
absence in agreement of purchase price or 
method of determining purchase price. Duke v« 
Whadey (1991, Miss) 580 So 2d 1267. 
?
-Fact* that no price was mentioned at which 
pre-emptive right was to be exercised did not 
make agreement, void for uncertainty since 
words, "first refusal" implied that holder of right 
could purchase at same price offered by third 
party. Klein y Brodie (Mont) 534 P2d 1251. 
•"—First option to buy {property] at a price to 
be agreed upon in the event [owner] places the 
premises for sale" provided definitely ascer-
tained standard by which the price term could 
be determined—that of an acceptable offer for 
the property from a third party. Di Maria v 
Michaels (1982, 4th Dept) 90 App Div 2d 676, 
455 NYS2d 875 (citing annotation). 
§ 7. [New] Other provisions 
Under provision giving option to lessee of 
portion of farmland "at the same price for which 
the lessor would be willing to sell to any other 
person," price would become definite if land-
lord, offered to sell or sold demised premises 
alone to purchaser for certain price, but price 
of demised premises alone did not become fixed 
77 
where landlord sold entire farm, including 
demised premises, without separately pricing 
demised premises. Myers v Lovetinsky (Iowa) 
!89 NW2d 571 (citing annotation). 
2 ALR3d 724-738 
§ 1 [2ALR3d725] 
[b] Related matters 
i'74 Am Jur 2d, Trademarks and Tradenames 
1
 Jurors as within coverage of workers' compen-
sation acts. 13 ALRSth 444. '- " ••-.-• -"] "•- - ' 
Workers' compensation: compensability of 
injury during tryout, employment test, or simi-
lar activity designed to determine employability. 
8 ALRSth 798. 
Activities of insurance adjusters as unautho-
rized practice of law. 29 ALR4th 1156. ' • ; < 
' Existence and extent of right of litigant in 
avil case, or of criminal defendant, to represent 
himself before state appellate courts. 24 ALR4th 
430. •' • ' • : : - ' -• ' " j : "•:'••••.' •• 
.Layman's assistance to party iii divorce pro-
ceeding as unauthorized practice of law. 12 
ALR4th656. _ ' v . , . . / / 
h Right of party litigant to defend or counter-
claim on ground that opposing party or his 
attorney is engaged in unauthorized practice of 
law. 7ALR4th 1146. , . ; ; _ . ' . 
;<Sale of books or forms designed to enable 
layman to achieve legal results without assis-
tance of attorney as unauthorized practice of 
law. 71 ALR3d 1000. .. ... , .
 r, -. 
-i Representation of another before state public 
utilities or service commission as involving 
practice of law. 13 ALR3d 812. . - . 
:
 Activities of law clerks as illegal practice of 
law. 13 ALR3d 1137. .- r
 r .. . 
Auto-Cite®: Cases and annotations referred to 
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2 ALR3d 748-754 
§1 12ALR3d748] 
[b] Related matters 
Validity and construction of state statutes 
penalizing "criminal simulation'* of goods or 
merchandise. 72 ALR4th 1071. ....
 rV> , 
.Unfair competition: geographical extent of 
protection of word or symbol under doctrine of 
secondary meaning. 41 ALR3d 434. < ''.n\-„-r. . ; 
Right of publisher of newspaper or magazine, 
in absence of contractual 'obligation, to refuse 
publication of advertisement. 18 ALR3d 1286. 
78 
Admissibility and weight of consumer survey 
in litigation under trademark opposition, trade-
mark infringement, and false designation of 
origin provisions of Lanham Act (15 USCS 
§§ 1063, 1114, and 1125). 98 ALRFed 20. ' 
Parodv as trademark or tradename infringe-
ment. 92 ALR Fed 25,V^"'... ^ ; ^ ; J ; ; ^.:> , v : , 
_ Letters, initials, or numerals as common-law 
trademarks. 56 ALR Fed 232. j .,-. .n.,-:,*:* •>'.:-
°What constitutes "false* advertising" of food 
products or cosmetics within sees. 5 and 12 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 USCS 
secs.M5, 52). 50 ALR Fed 16. : - ^ ^ "* 
' What constitutes "false advertising" of drugs 
and devices within §§ 5 and 12 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Acr(15 USCS §§ 45, 52). 
49 ALR Fed 16. " v ° ^ : ^ i : ' ^ : c * /:~ ."•;: <• 
-r Right of owner of trademark for apparel or 
toiletries to protection under Lanham Act (15 
USCS §1.114(1)) against infringement by anoth-
er's use of similar mark for different items of 
apparel or toiletries. 38 ALR Fed 374. '}-., *: . 
Laches as affecting claim for accounting and 
damages in federal action for infringement of 
trademark or tradename; 14?ALR Fed 342. .,»•—.:. 
3 Am Jur Proof of Facts~2d 577, Trade Dress 
(Packaging) Simulation. ";• «• ~^\ '"•*- /.*• * NI 
' 1 8 Am Jur Proof bf Facts 2d 265, Unfair com-
petition—appropriation of competitor's adver-
tising matter, methods, or slogan. ,~: J ' 
47 Am Jur 'Proof of. Facts 2d 643, Wrongful 
use of another's trademark or tradename. < 
14 Am Jur Trials 1, Actions for Unfair Com-
petition—Trade Secrets/ *i :>1" c - • r :U: .. 
Auto-Cite®: Cases and annotations referred to 
herein can be further researched through the 
1
 Auto-Cite® computer-assisted research ser-
~vice. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for 
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- history, and annotation references. 
§2
 :[2ALR3d749] 
Department of Citrus of State of Florida, 
which had spent over $13,000,000 in advertising 
and creating public recognition and good will 
toward words '"sunshine tree" in. establishing 
certification mark, was entitled to preliminary 
injunction in action against sellers of orange 
juice product, being marketed.under brand 
name "Sunshine Tree.". Florida v Real Juices, 
Inc. (DC Fla) 330 F Supp 428. ~ 
Holder of "Honey Baked Ham" trademark 
would be entitled to injunction prohibiting 
competitor from using "Honeysweet Ham" in 
conjunction with cooked ham products, where 
evidence established likelihood of confusion be-
tween products which posed substantial threat 
of harm to holder of trademark. Schmidt v 
ADDENDUM 10 
1 Williston, Contracts, (3d Ed. 1957) §41 
MAKING OF OI-'FFRS §41 
An cxpre*> promise to continue a buMncto u> ]vw. w it h 
profitable or p:iy^ expenses," or to rominue an arrauyeniciil 
as long as one pnrly shall "handle il saiisfaeiorily to the othr.i ."*• 
hits bc«n heM tug indefinite ft« enforcement. And U pnmrisr. 
to perfuitti UH long as the promisee remains in a certain husi-
I K ^ has also been regarded n* too indefinite.11 So a promise 
to renew The phintUTs notes "until such time as the improve-
ment in the business situation should enable him to proceed 
in business without such assistance" is merely Ma hopeful en-
couragement sounding only in prophecy/*17 A protni.su whirh 
ircnl, "when the piupcr time comes, |1 | will buy for you." was 
held tiKi indefinite Urr entorccmenftt 
§ 4L Offers Indefinite as to Price. It is by no weaiw im 
^onHnotHt»Mfco£e whooffer or agree to employ others, or to 
buy goods, Jo makc\no siatemcptJas to the wages or pricfr tn 
be paid,1* The law invokes here (as likewise where an agree-
v Walter Mack <& Sere* Co 
Mich 453. 250 NW 287, 
ZM 
) ^ 
14. Pulltam v Schimpf, 109 Ala 
179. 19 So 42S; Anderson v Vo« 
Camp Sea hood Cn <>$ Cat App ?S7, 
( U f ^ A - * * ^ * w P 1<W>. to wuphty timli cm 
pierce'* ijnkhrcdfl«A lu vfnptover wu* 
Paul itr ftrtl; Drvvic v 1 luDUsiman'a 
Mm Ta ^ Mich 4 U 53 NW $25, 
2-1 LRA -W. 
Sec supra, 5 ?P. 
15. M,uwa Hotel i,'^ , v nfcXInson. 
J4» A»k 188. 216 SW 104* And 
ace tafia. 1675A. 
16. Bastbn v Marienvilk Glass Co. 
2S1 PA 31 J. 126 A 7!tf; Norma v 
Morehouse CTcs Civ App> 24} SW 
1104. 
17* H;iH v First Nat. Hk. 17> M&« 
16, 33 Ni: IM. «W LKA JWfc 
Luca* v Federal Re*. 15k of Rich-
mond. SV F2d <S17 fCCA 4); Jirowij 
v Fuhcy, 15/ MO 4«S, 146 A 264; 
Ycrion v Allison (Tex Civ App) 242 
SW 270> Spooncr v Reserve L. Ins, 
Co. (W&sh2d) 287 P2d 725, crfc 44 
OU U 145, 
18. Stewart v Johnson, 252 Mass 
287, 147 NE ft5Q, 
f r W:ii:-i — . ~ 
19. See pcflerally Res'- CimUiitK 
8 32 -find fallowing CUKCK: Standard 
nil Co. v NfarMiant, 64 V Supp bMi 
(DC Sn NY) mod 16.1 F2d 917, wit 
den 3*.< Ub JIM, <P I cd 1149. otf 
Winn* thi agrtttiirut and hs 
Hinrmlmrnu *cre mcomplrir, iuduH-
irtie and uncertain, r^riir«Uily a* n» 
term* or payment, they fcvrr ren-
dered uncnfuiccuble, Brucci'man v 
Sold. 1Z2 C.nl App7,l g76, 265 i'.««t 
575; California Uttuw Grower*, inr 
w Union Snjtiii Co. (Cil Ai»i»2di 27K 
P2d 1(16. reversed tC':d2d) 28V P2d 
785. which held the comma in u^ic 
uas m>! niuMiry. infr^  n 1. 
W i^f v Aram. JW (in App 568. 77 
AJfc*2d ttf» liiiMtms text) ccjipU -^meni 
contract: Rr2i];di>ti w Shapiro, 146 Mr 
S3. 77 A2d 59R: C">^ i« v Mc^thlin. 
?26 Mass 732. % Nl"2d 702, agree-
meot for nddiiiomi) coiupvnvjnon 
*iiutt bvjvlncv; proutuble; M;irs«> > 
Tinnf, 226 Minn 540. 1? NW2«J 717. 
reasonable vahic implied 
Where the contract gave a whole-
sale dhitifniror the exclusive right u> 
disiribuic hakery products, reserving 
to the h^ kcry ihc rijlit w ftx priet^  
without Selling forth any mcihoH <«r 
$41 WIM.IMUN UN fUWrHAC'lS 
mcni is indefinite as to time) the standard of reasonableness. 
Accordingly the hit vnhie of ibe HTVKCS m property i«i r rcnv 
arable on the contract implied in fact.11 Sometimes, however, 
ascertaining the price, uncertainty in 
the contract wa& held to preclude the 
distributor from enforcing tlic COJJ-
rraet by injunction :tg.*tin<t sales by 
bakery to anyone other than disrrih-
otor. MoorclaJT Dtstrih Co. Inc. v 
Arnold Rakers, Inc. I Ni taper stdi, 
Savarrw v Pviti« Mf& Co. !> NJ 
W , by A2d 2^7; Maiucni % Vdu^idii 
Motor Co,, Inc. 134 Or 103. 104 P2d 
1H>2, exdutivo t^lil ID *il m ir-a-toi*-
abio list nrlco to Ui liud; Wmdaor 
MI& Co. v Mukranslyy* 332 Pa 4<ik 
MM A 84. 105 ALK 1096, approved 
11 Temp I.Q 250; Western Newspaper 
Union, lac. v Shalt* (p<0 04 A2d 
4P3# approximately an amount per 
week held stiilkicnt. 
ITiar the objection of indefinite. 
nc» of pikw ia obviated when there 
13 A aUnilxd ftu ttr trimming the 
prico* we Kan-da v Karrth, 234 Wfc 
44, 290 NW 624. 
See Percrftrn v Pilgrim Vill«$«, 25o 
Win ftji. 4* NWM 27?, 1* Al Kfct 
206. find ammfntirtrt p. 2jj f «Uequj 
KltCS M to dftSmfrnc** of agicciueitl 
to pay employee *hare ot proh&M 
20. JButtnttfon* of this rule in 
agreements for service* may be found 
in the following, anions other dcci-
snow; Miller v Ballerina* t35 Oal 
56fc 67 P 104^ <£ p 600: Clark r 
Clark, 40 Conn >Kte Howell v R w , 
«7 < ,wm |>y, «7 A 355; Pulmer v 
\<*lyit, 7 &oyc« <Dolj 54/, IUV A 
125; Well* v Huyfitfti, 101 Ctt R41, « 
Sii W8; Loci wood v br*huu, u* 
Inrf mt 2S NE 4$t; Clark v £U» 
wonh, \(\4 h 442, 73 NW 10?v. 
laUi* v WKlrin (fa) 195 NW I00X; 
Norwood V I-athrop. !/fc Mass 20ft, 
59 NL' 650; SCIOTO
 v firyant, 54 Minn 
434, 5€ NW 58, 21 l.KA 41S; Swift 
v Johnson, 175 Mo App 660, 158 SW 
Contract for payment of specified 
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*iro monthly urol reasonable percent-
age of promisor's net profits for serv-
ice* rendered by pr<mtr«c was held 
too indefinite for enforcement, bin 
the promisee m;iy recover on quantum 
tttcmit fui Midi icrviccv subject to 
limitation* and restriction* impowtl 
by the contract, i-omng v Muilieud 
Cotamcrciul CU 112 Motil 146. II* 
Kid It*. 
Randall v Packard, 142 NY 4/. *h 
NIL 823; IVtkiliv ^ HuvbtiHH'l, l".^  Hn 
4 H 2* A 6H5; Siauduid Piml Oi v 
Dfmomt h»W. Co. K> Wu 12/, 56 
NW 218; McNnmarn v McNumaru, 
108 Wis 613. U4 NW ^al: arid Mipm. 
9§?6. 41. 
JliuMraUons ct the rule in repaid 
io \IK price of (coods win be found 
in the iollONvirg decisions; Western 
Pac. R. Corp, v W^tcrn H^ R. Co. 
1<r? KM VW <C'A o,
 K.vU ou itdi^i 
(TOUfutv 345 US 247. 97 I, cd 9861 73 
S O 655; Shentv v Wwnrda, 73 Ala 
175; Diukcrnun v Ohyshi hnpunutt 
f*u. 65 f\*l A|ip 101, 2J8 P 45H; Mc-
F-.uxn v Morey, *& W 32; Jenkins 
v Richvd«or>. (* I J Ma^h (Ky) -Ul; 
("onbeII v Summit thread K'tu 132 
Me 4U. IA7 A 79. 9: Al.R 1311. in-
Vtffttrons; Ta/i v Irttvis, 136 M.-tsv V5; 
Loveioy v MtohcU. M Mich 15, 4*J 
NW 901, 13 1 HA 770. 
Application L* re;ts<tji:ibtc value, «ce 
ffilitiitci V ,Sli«. H*n*i <*k f-tiilrr li» 
3'»?. Mi> V!?\ IKt SW.M ^'t-t. 
Stout • CArwtberuitU IK\rdwAie 
Co. 131 Mo AUM 520. 1J0 SW (319. 
P 29U; Afuntell v International Plantic 
llaiiivnnKA ff"*Hj.. 141 Nl l!«j 37^r 55 
A2d 250, 17? AI.R i IK5; Wtlkittt v 
Jorkfon* 100 d i n 143, 22? P £82. 
PnVr nmy jjiviw the rcnsonublc or 
murkei price at date of delivery. Pot-
ter v l.citcnbcrgcr Mae a. Co. 166 Pa 
Super 3i. 70 A2d 390. 
Secen v Potts (SO) 61 NW2d 825; 
Standard Coed Co. v Stewart, 72 Utah 
[ f Willjatoa Ott Contract! ] 
MAKING OF OFFERS $ 41 
the terms of a promise exclude the supposition thai the reason-
able or marled ptiet? was intended. 1M MU,II a case no comrnct 
can arise.1 Rut the promise of an indefinite payment in addi-
tion to u dellnirr price, lliuugh unenforceable as made may be 
"significant a* rebutting an aguxmetu that ifet' value was liqui-
dated by the liquidation of the daily wage," and thus preserve 
the right to recover lo tint extent the reasonable value exceeds 
272, *<B ? ICI4; Accbul v T*vy, 10 
Brag 376; Hoadly v MXaxnc. 10 Binfl 
482; Valpy v Gibson, 4 CB $37; and 
supra. I 3GA. 
Several courts have upheld con-
tracts far wlr of gomln At prices to be 
later agreed upon hy il« ujjtie& .W in 
M)bsMn<r pmvuimg fui u *e440nabt$ 
prtcc. Unliod Sum* * Swift. 270 US 
I2<f 70 L «d W , 4* S Ci *M; 
Abram? v Gewjn- ? Keith Cu. iO 1* 
2d M <CCA */; Fujft v r.nwn. Mri 
Mm Ml, HI1 to Wl, J« ALU 675: 
IVtmiHiM rt loyr-c I o. v Hamilton 
Furnace Co, 108 Oh St 25, 140 NF 
4S5i Ettfeo* v Boyd, 130 SC 269. 125 
SE 493, 36 ALR 855, For collection 
of cases, 3cc 49 ALR 1464. Sec infra, 
J 4$, and *4& 
4.t. Wilfaton, Sales CRev etf) J1GS: 
Prower, upon Prfr* In ftmrracr* for 
rhA Sal* of Goadx, 16 Mfaa JLK. 73J. 
fc&d NOtC. fronfltftt lit Kity <u VII 
at A Prirr to ht VhtA tn the taint?, 
27 Gil LR 70S. 
1, fJcbrtrtfca Aircraft Corp Y Var* 
ney, 2X2 F oti* (CCA *), BtuuLt * 
hoJciid Sut« Co. 24 T2d 8Q4, 37 ALR 
743 (App LK.*)i Kill Wiiifc Sim* O I 
v ShcpltciJ Safely Shoe Corp. 1W r 
2d 415 (CCA I) discussed m Con-
tract Certainty of Terms—Flexible 
Price Ckiuie. 27 Tex LK $9, v,hcxc 
price being found out definite, held 
no true ofter. 
Where defendant Agreed to exam-
ine plaintiff** recipe for fruit flavor* 
'"only with flse undcntatidin* that the 
u$e to be nude of it by m, and UK 
compensation, if aov to be paid there-
for, are marten: resting cotely in oux 
i!iM.ieliifiil1v ilut Luted qifciM can-
Uaetual recovery because plaintiff 
cho4-«* to rely merely upon the jood 
faith and lairncvt of the dclcnduui 
to recompense her for tlK* value of 
ihc recipe* Dairi* y General Foods 
Corp. 21 F sSurn 445 Civ: SD NY). 
Where pcuiio attempted to awver 
Jill mntwn pci ujiujift to rnmroci and 
lnf* ilii/i pjjuic; MMnbi»d nf payment 
tn br Agreed Upou beJuic d l^lvrry," 
Ux conrt held thio pr^ented forma-
tion At crmtroct* Avaton Pnxlt« l\ v 
i,cnuH PS C^ J Af«|i7«l ivv, /.iv i»2d 
The court in C«t*ii»» »^ n i-ettucc 
Growcn. Jnx-. » Uixiuii buj.v Co. 
(Cal App2J> 27S P2d 106, quintet. Uio 
foregoing case, the tcx; ;«ul variom 
other eases eiied in the following fool-
rotes and wax reversed iu CCaHdl 2S9 
P2d 7K5. which hiid f>Mf contract w;i% 
ri^ r illaiorv, supru n 1^ . 
Jumc^ tntrti Puittand Cement Co. v 
Kwcwlr.. ??R Ma« \7t. 117 NF 41; 
Giruj$tf W \VI)I##T. Im- v/<?v1I P.;til 
im, 1H6 Ml. 5621 Wcincf v Pictorial 
Pflpr.r Pqykaeu tiuip. 1HU M^w tM. 
2U NIJil 4.^ A. rcanonnhlc conjpcutui-
tion implied n< ciiiiitnci fui pcrma-
ucul cwploymftnt; Van Meertiwcti « 
Sv/anson, 121 Mmn 2>«i, ill NW 
J12: l^ cwu v Aionuw, 77 Mnni 34H, 
251 P 14/). 
In Sun Pufiling As^ n. v Remington 
Paper iu . 235 NY ,158. 139 NF" 470. 
rm agreement io sell poinds in the 
future which prnvklnl tlmi il* inke 
Of them shtwld he agreed to fi«in 
time to lime, bul ihould not exceed 
the maximum chnr$e for simitar 
fioodi by another company, vn* held 
not a contract on the grcnml thai 
the time at which the maximum 
should he taken wa* noi fixed. 
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Ihc specified sum*1 On the other hand, u prumi.se may attempt 
to define the price but do so too indefinitely tor enforcement,* 
ns by sucb words as "not exceeding .yjoo a week/'4 the cost, 
plus a "niceM profit,' a division ot profits ""upon a very liberal 
t^ms/* "a reasonable amount from the prolhi^ "a portion** 
of ihe promisor's estate,1 "a part of the money•"* "to reduce 
the rem,""1 "a due allowance/'" "money to enable them to 
cirty on their businc^1* **good wages,"1* "the average priced1* 
*L Von Rcitxemtein v Tomfoisoii, 
219 NV 00. Id: NF 5*4. Aire. Pnj* 
Slwi & Witc Co. v ttluir fca$. ( a . 
?> FM JOV «vrr ilen ?7<S US *2J. 
72 L cd 737, 48 S C\ $QX 
AfdHMiyh A |iuifui<r tti pay **.u* 
compensation *a* too mdctinit< to 
bo enforceable, employee wm en-
tilted to recover on quantum meruit 
a:i execs* amount according to the 
value e l hi* services, nnflrfon * 
Staph*, 146 Mc 23, 77 A2d m 
(quoting text). 
3, Dorrfc v Johoson. 363 III 2*fc. 
2 NH2d 74, 104 AIR 029, holdioj; 
HKI v;!£W> riftH Indefinite fi bnl of 
$10,000 4i 4 WJwul *ak' U execution 
deblt'ii tiwiiml n tmr4i»tlf interest and 
t>iU.VUU it ftta o\vi>*i dli 
4, Untied Pr^v, v New Ytffk |»rcxa 
r*i. t A-l MV 40*. 5S ML $±t. v 
LRA 2A8. ftdkmail in Sim Primlna 
A*Mt. v ftcmin^ron Taper Cv, 2i> 
NV 3M, H9 NT- 4?0, But Jingum 
Grocery Cto. v t iiw*. w Vi dt>.\ 120 
A 140, **not over 26* per lb.H meant 
rciiHitriable price tt> be determined by 
market conditions cxi*iini; ;IT iimr ai 
delivery, but ncn in nny event to be 
more than the maximum u;om'<l. 
5, Ciftim'* v R ? Reynold* Tv4>aeu» 
CV 165 Ky 716. 17 % $W 4 « . ,v* 
Jlubktid * Turnct Dv:pL Sturc t o 
<Mv App> 27$ *w IUOIK »«cr oi 
emptoynrcnt ai SI25 per momlj "und 
a purr or the protns that thrntW mean 
from $25 to 550 per mo, extra", 
recovery above fixed price denied. 
6, Duller v Kemmcrcr, 2IS Pa 242* 
&7 A 332. Ace.. Von Rritzeaslcin v 
Tomiidrto, 249 MY 60, 162 NE 5S4, 
1 3 3 
'.in uppigpinitc t*,*iwenU£?" of d* 
benefit* 
Jn Cit'orfi.i Onf Piod r»t. v Tout 
Trod Rcf. Co. l-*l ( U -to. wo SF. 3l«, 
rhe court held: ' ine nnno^ncerocnt 
i*f un fniL*mk»« io udo^r n ilhcral 
y\ttit ul fM\Hii-.slMu« /^ Os^ -'i nut vicait 
ii ttlltliml f««i Ally tk'JixiUf jlhilJ. ill 
fiHi iiny ujiatn «tiK>mil m {MopurlKiu 
Of proliK or one to cORHnuc \Q? any 
ecrtuifi Umc.'* 
7. Ciind v Sjwilb- ^^ Misc 99, 
14<> NYS ten. 
Allsm v ILir^iJii^c-Mckiiiriuk Dry 
Oocd i^ Co. J15 M<i J54. ?K6 SW 1ft, 
^•Iirt^ pluinttit u^rvct) U'irh <lcfcnd(int, 
his employer, to o»r\ntt.jr .iml man 
ii>v TI nmv iimiteh of the business to 
wJ<iUi IT ;^i>. ;IM r*pi*U. \mtf dct'CQd 
ant promised him "a fCH^ l '.hjirv oi 
ltt«t jtrulit\" h*4<t plfitntKT entitled to 
50 pti vCJd. tlf Uw ifMl,«KK) ntl«llls of 
llu* HniTU'ii Kiisin<*^ \ under thti con* 
tract. A mimniiv vi UK: COUH tiH>k 
the view rh.ir fh^ IWJIMKI W ^ too 
illdolinite to hv « eorur.ut ;ind tfir 
Ktn^cty, there*ore, was »|»>;IM awi 
tr*u*nuil. 
Noble v lUJim-tl i n. :o»x Mu« 7>, 
f>4 Nl .?Hli. "a l.ui ami vH i^t^ i»ir 
^lm« <>l act pig|'ilNM aptivJd. 
JJ. WuJJX Appeal. Jit I'u 1^ >, .^  A 
220. 
9. Bunicy
 v Joiics, I4U CJ.I 758, 79 
SE iJ40. 
10* 5vmim v Ankrim. 13 S«?rg A R 
It . Re Vim-e. HHV2J 2 f>B. 478. 
12, Prwin v t iwm, 25 AJn 236. 
Aue., I.g^iu y ic i ic i j ! Re*. Hk. of 
MAKjNTt O F OTTERS §41 
These have been held too indefinite for enforcement, But ;» 
promise that another shall be •'well paid" may he enforced us n 
promise for rcstsonablc- comjx'.nyation.11 V.VCH a promise lo ;m 
injured workman that in case he failed to recover lib health 
within six weeks the employer would "make it right'* was held 
not 100 indefinite.18 ——^ _ -
rTa promise, indefinite as to price b capable of being nuule 
wrtain by an objective standard as, for example, extrinsic facts, 
it h cufttrceabltf17 
Kkhrmmd, 59 T2d 627 (CCA 4>. 
piomi*e 10 extend *och additional ac-
cominmlatioQx m the way of discount 
a* Wi>»lJ he necessary to meet the 
additional btirdcitt assumed* Hui in 
Stfm v Premier Shirt tlmp 2W NY 
?W. 183 NE j61% pnmif*f le provide 
"funds juifucicDi to curry on the bust* 
rwssM upheld 
|«\ Tuirplay Sehoot Township t 
ONctoi, !.»./ tnd ft>, 2Ct >5H. f>W. 
lit Dr* Mtwie* Witter Wyrkx Ot. v 
J>s Moinev M> In v:«, $i K W ?.r.<*. 
Child* v Columbia 87 St." 209. /u 
$l: 1<)K denying specxiic performance 
of h;uiattn u» lurcush waiter to mm-
vcv'uicm at "the usual and customary 
charge*," no lime being specified, te* 
cawvc h uas too indefinite, 
35. Vvncr* deicml.nitt orally a^ocd 
to p.\v plain till fpnuuakct udditiouaJ 
twnpcrmiiotu if and uteri defend* 
ums* hardware busing bcromc pint* 
hiihle, it u-aa Heid that it phriiuiiT* 
fhiitgcx wcte tnh and reasonable, und 
thf itrranju'incm u:i* foi defendant** 
bnvta. defendants' promise w«w nor 
void IUI ftroimd th.it it wa* loo iiidcit-
Rile, Cygan v Menuthlin, 326 Ma» 
//2« 9ti Nt:2d /"2, 
Luverone v Lcvcrone, 220 Mass 
W. 101 W. 527; D a w v Teachout* 
\2U Mich 135, 85 NW 475; Levitt v 
Miller, tr\ Mo App M7. 
I*. ft varum v rmptoyeiV l i u k 
Assur. Corp, 2H Ma*> 365, 100 Nit 
632 wheiein the court staled? ,rThn 
Jiwv mij^l haw ioim»t that under 
tho wirvnmatfiitnft th* *orA> 'mnVc 
ii ri^ht' uwnmi th.it in the coniia-. 
peney named the pUmliiTS riucMUtr 
ainuitd have fair eomrertNation paid 
to him in money for the to juries-.suf-
fered by him. . * . Hie promise 
h not void o*i the proutid thm it i* 
tno indelinfT .^ Jwnr* uic cmivtuotly 
AOIVJUB such |irobl«msfH 
( t . Rird v J. !.. Pfc^eott Co. 8^ 
Nil J<H, 9«> A 3R0, 
A proo^iv to employ "M <i livtnp. 
wai^*' w v itfiltvld lw trbhe? v Kopcr 
i.wm Cu. \*\ Hil -18 .^ IU SI- W7% 
J5 AIK. 1417. 
17. KnH'Ji V AndcrKim Pikh^iid 0»1 
Corp. U> F Supp >?** (TX* W!) f>Ua}4 
agreement to furnUh &*M.4'WC "at the 
lew price for 7.^-7^ cK-tnnc ON sh<»wii** 
in n spccilkd newspaper ou "itafr of 
delivery" l»eld Mudmfc 
Hoywp •*c!lirr,K pciec l^ f ut timi> 
fntuic order placed too indefinite. 
Nebr.-^ ka Airvtufl Toip. v Vuifltry, 
2»2 T MW fC*CA H). ofiti-nt pr«Ve list, 
utid W^toii fapri Mf^ . «"«^ . v D<»WJI-
in>t Uo\ To. 21.* F /25 trC'A 7). 
In Mcxm Mulor O r Co. ««f N. V-
v Mot>*i MflUu Cur C**. 2f> FJd 1 
(Ct!A ?> hotdtor. an eat low vc tttxiicy 
tMiitixict het«.ecn *«i «iioimilwlc n»at>-
ufactitrvr and « distributor not i&kt 
indermhe. the conn observed; "Hictc 
is tio Objection l<» a pnjiiiise that 
it it* jnd^fmite «o luo^ n* the pur-
rit**f cati itll v^h<n « hny bcf«\ per-
formed, und it ix cnooph rf, when 
tlie time nrrivc*. there shall be in 
cxiMcuec *mvt tfaiidard by wlm-h 
that ••«« ht teMvd , • * Wh*i» the 
Jwyvr urt»6i rhooAC -«tnf*ng cla.s:^ nf 
dtuitflU whrrh AI« tlefjrtr«»l v< win *K 
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So a promise for services thai ;i testator would leave the 
promisee "full and plenty after he was gone so thai she need 
not woik" was enfweed as an f»blij;atioii lo leave an amount 
sufficient to buy an annuity thai would support the promisee 
in the mode of life to which she had been accustomed" A 
promise to bequeath "as much as to any relation on earth" was 
held too indefinite by ibe same court/9 but another court round 
that similar words Furnished a standard by the term* oi the 
promise wliirh could be applied with cuiriness.11 And a pr un-
qualified by « guarantee apahw decline of market prices of coin-
pedtivc goods prior to the time for performance of the contract fet 
sufficiently definite*1 The general view Ls thai where the price 
of goods is to be fixed in relation to the official quotation of a 
designated market, or to the price set by a dominant seller of 
the particular kind of goods on a certain day or on delivery, 
the provision controls if there is such a quotation or price set,* 
whvn tbc time comes m*t ut prire* 
th?n lUcd by oumctinnf. filter than 
the r»fi.imjscc'* will. cxcrcuAi! m\ hoc* 
lira usual nxtc IK dun aa obligation 
arixa." 
••tec laveson V Wurncr Mfc Corp. 
117 FSurr* 124 U>C D Nil. 
Chicsa. l.OCtefA £ Co. v Andrew*. 
61 f i d 572 (CCA 6); Sufcrrincr v 
ShAnahan, 105 Neb *7\ 181 NW 53f>. 
**tUc tor ptfcc ohraiiiuLtfc" M»l too 
indefinite; Fountain v Fountain, a Ni 
555, SS> A2d $, promise to support, 
"An agreement for &alc of £***!* 
which spcriltes no prk* and, thrfr 
tore requires a rceoufa? to A QUI-
kfi tor the swccitummcm of a 
rMMwaWe piicr, u a valid contract " 
Franklin Sugar ttrf. Co* v I.ipowicz 
M/ NY 4ft1. 160 Nfc JH6, 59 ALR 
J114. 
As u> contract baan fur site of 
*tock at book value* $cc f w i s v fried 
& Sunt. Inc. tMijc) U? NY252J 400. 
s w i 281 AD *5i. t ip NYSM 2*b; 
Wood V Lady ttnlT-Gordan. 222 NY 
Stf, IS* NE 214;. Cuaipbrll v New 
York City, 244 NY 317, 1«5 N £ e,>xt 
pntvafliiitf tale of Wngi-s MI locality, 
WtodMir tffg. i n v Makransky. 
322 PA 4 % Iflo A $ 4 Itis Atfc ^o%, 
jpprowl, U T«cap LQ 7 ^ , blanker 
1 3 4 
order; Dtid* v T^t l'cttii Rolty 
Co* 331 P.i Super 111. 2tK> A C 
t l / Ai.ft Iflvi, option in trtiv !«> 
ptt'l'talS?. 
Sen ii«fin 4 47«. 
18. liwujfiMvn v Stevens. 71 V* 
16!; j-vifU v Hiiukt <Md> ItW AM 
Hit. 
19, Graham v fiulam's P.xcs. 34 
23. So held iti SylvcMcr'R Caac. 
Pctptam 14R. 
I. Salter v I.ced»m ^ Worrell Co. 
??2 F HI t< CA -1i, Kinsrose Co, v 
VY. & J. Sloa^r, : ; : ^ 4-ts (CCA V>. 
nprctiiiciii ni seller m ,i!lurd rn<»ice 
tkui j>| | 0 jvt vcM of ilu* <oKt; t . C, 
Moomo Co. v Ciirtstcnirfi. M (*,^ | 
Apr 4/4. ??4 V 141: Miu-hclt v 
CaDtfufbtt Realty ( a 121 Mc M2. ' t» 
A J7?. highvM itiarkci pntr; Hull 
Co. v Wcsccifivlil. 107 Nvb 7111. lx#» 
WW «JSI2, 29 AIR !<)'>, jtssnp #& 
Mnoic Paper Co, v Ur>->tit Paper < \ \ 
2K1 Pa 4J4, PO A 55'*. Pwidcnce 
Icr Co. v lt,nvvn. 44 Hi 173, II4 A 
1S6; mum & Galtyjhrr Cow ¥ P«t 
tlsh.43 Wy« t « 2 , 2 » P /OK. 
*, Mtftucme •VtcJ A Wire t y> v 
r « u c Oil CA it l-ld >m (CCA 7), 
MAKING OF OFVFRS §42 
but in (he absence of such u quotation or sci [nice the contract 
is inoperative to the extent that it remains executory,'* A piicc 
is sufficiently detmite, however, if it can be ascertained by 
computation,* 
$ 42. Offers Indefinite as to WorJc or froperiy to ftc Given. 
As a promise may insufficiently specify the price to be paid, 
so the consideration for which the price is to hr paid may be 
left equally uncertain, :md in such a caw it h not usually pos-
sible to invoke the standard of fcasctnublcncss in order to give 
the promise sufficient dctmitencss to make il enforceable.1 U 
providing Cut CNtftift f* r^c6itiiij»c ii» 
c r w * ci <to*c-uic Muvt«r prnscm 
innrwd market pi ice of t'ruirir Oil & 
G*«. O tor Mtd-Coj»rtn«iital rrtidc 
ptHtaltujii whiwli U «rw $1.50 \KX 
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ADDENDUM 1 1 
JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and 
RICHARD W. DAYNES (5686), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 21,741 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA 
BALDWIN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT OF THE VERDICT 
Case No. 930600024 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
There is attached hereto and made a part hereof the Verdict Form executed by the jury. 
On the basis of such verdict, judgment on the verdict is entered in the amount of $8,000.00. 
DATED this day of December, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
DAWNA BARNEY 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
J:\JHUONES-JU.VER 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
TIMOTHY WILLARDSON, for: 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of December, 1995. 
Timothy Willardson 
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle 
10885 South State 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
SECRETARY 
J:\JHUONES-JU.VER 
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ADDENDUM 12 
JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and 
RICHARD W. DAYNES (5686), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 Our File No. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA 
BALDWIN, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 930600024 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
This matter having come on regularly for trial before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
Judge, sitting with an advisory jury on questions of equity and presiding at a trial by jury on 
matters of law as distinguished from matters of equity; and the Court having convened on the 
27th day of November, 1995, for the purpose of such trial, and the trial having continued 
through November 28, 29, and 30, 1995; and a jury having ben impaneled on the 27th day of 
November, which jury heard all factual questions; and the plaintiff having been represented by 
her attorneys, Jackson Howard and Richard W. Daynes of the law firm of Howard Lewis & 
Petersen; and the defendants having appeared in person and having been represented by their 
attorney Timothy Willardson of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer and Dahle; and the Court 
having heard testimony, and having received evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree in the above entitled 
case. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. The plaintiff, Ada Jones, together with one Marilyn Hansen, and the 
defendants, David Baldwin and Gloria Baldwin, his wife, on the 6th day of June, 1984, entered 
into an agreement to lease certain property which is the subject of this litigation. That 
agreement is represented by Exhibit 1 in this case. 
2. On or about the date of the agreement, June 6, 1984, the plaintiff and Marilyn 
Hansen entered into possession of said premises, which at that time consisted of the shell of a 
motel on the north side of such premises, a storage shed, and a service station structure, all of 
which had been unused and vacant for many years. The plaintiff and Hansen made 
improvements on the premises and converted the service station into a restaurant, and in a short 
while were operating the premises under the name and style of the "Burr Trail Cafe". Later in 
1988, the plaintiff converted a portion of the motel premises into living quarters. 
3. On or about the end of 1984, Marilyn Hansen withdrew as a party to the 
agreement, Exhibit 1, and conveyed her interest to the plaintiff. The defendants' registered no 
objection to the continuation of the said agreement by the plaintiff. 
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4. While no legal description was set forth in Exhibit 1, the premises were easily 
demarcated and the parties all understood the boundaries of the premises. During the trial the 
premises were described by a meets and bounds description as reflected on Exhibits 9 and 21, 
which description is set forth as follows: 
Beginning 5 chains West of Southeast corner of Section 26, 
Township 33 South, Range 4 East, and thence running North 
240 feet; thence East 157 feet; thence South 240 feet; thence 
West 157 feet to the point of beginning and containing .87 
acres. 
5. The agreement of 1984 was modified on two occasions, 1986 and 1988, by 
making changes by interlineation, such amendments being initialed by the plaintiff and 
defendant, David Baldwin. The defendant Gloria Baldwin's signature was placed on the 
document in 1984 at the time the first agreement was signed. Gloria Baldwin knew of, and 
approved of, and she never objected to the amendments made to the 1984 agreement and 
initialed by her husband David, many, of which were made in her presence. 
6. On or about July of 1992, the defendant David Baldwin orally advised the 
plaintiff, Ada Jones, that the old agreement of 1984 had expired in 1990, and therefore, a new 
agreement had to be executed. While his conclusion may not have been true, Ada Jones 
acquiesced to renew the written lease agreement, and thereafter, the plaintiff and defendants, 
David Baldwin and Gloria Baldwin, met in the Baldwin home on August 1, 1992, and the 
document entitled "agreement" which is exhibit 2, was drafted by the defendant, David Baldwin 
in his own hand and in the presence of Gloria Baldwin. David Baldwin selected the language 
of said instrument. Gloria Baldwin read the agreement as it was drafted. When complete, it 
was again read by all the parties and by the plaintiff and defendant Baldwin, whose signatures 
were later notarized. 
7. The agreement of August 1, 1992, can be read as an extension of, or 
modification of the agreement of June 6, 1984, because many of the terms of the first agreement 
were incorporated in writing or orally into the new agreement, such as the agreement pertaining 
to the accrual of one-half of the lease payments as equity to be applied to the purchase price. 
8. At all times during the creation and execution of exhibit 2, and thereafter, to 
the date of trial, David Baldwin was the agent of Gloria Baldwin, acting for and on her behalf 
and he specifically represented and held out that he was her agent acting on her behalf. 
9. Gloria Baldwin was fully apprised of the 1992 agreement. She received 
benefits under the 1992 agreement. Gloria Baldwin ratified the agreement by her conduct. 
10. In Paragraph 3 of the agreement of August 1, 1992, it was the intent of the 
parties to create an option to purchase for the plaintiff. The language of that provision is 
consistent with the intent to create an option and inconsistent with the intent to create a right of 
first refusal. 
11. The plaintiff, from time to time, during the tenure of her lease, 1984 to 1995, 
was delinquent in the payment of rentals, but it became a pattern for the defendants to accept 
late lease payments; however, at the time of tender, in May of 1993, the plaintiff was current, 
and all late payments had been accepted by the defendants. 
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12. On May 7, 1993, the plaintiff made a tender to the defendants, Exhibit 3, in 
conformity with the law. The defendants refused to comply with the plaintiffs option or to 
reply to her tender. There was no justification for the defendants to refuse to elect to appoint 
appraisers or accept the amount tendered by the plaintiff. The failure of the defendants to 
respond as required by Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-3 was a breach of contract which left the 
plaintiff with only the remedy of filing a lawsuit. 
13. At the time of entering into the contract, and when defendants failed to 
acknowledge the tender, it was forseeable to the defendants that damages would accrue to the 
plaintiff by reason of failure to company with the tender. 
14. The plaintiff presented evidence through a qualified appraiser, that the fair 
market value of the property at the date of the tender, assuming that it had a marketable title, 
was $39,000.00. The plaintiff had tendered payment of $40,000.00, to which the defendants 
made no objection. No evidence of value was offered by the defendants. The Court, therefore, 
finds that the fair market value of the property is $40,000.00. 
15. The plaintiff stayed in possession and paid all rental payments until she was 
evicted. In February of 1995, she was ejected from the premises and the defendants went into 
possession, changed the name of the restaurant to the "Hitch'n Post" and began operating the 
said establishment. 
16. At the time of her ejectment, the plaintiff had operated the restaurant and 
property, made substantial improvements, established a gift shop, and was not in default under 
her agreement with the defendants. She further had established a loyal and satisfied clientele 
and had developed sizeable good will. 
17. The defendants have failed to pay certain tax arrearages. It is reasonable that 
the defendants be permitted to pay all delinquent taxes and assessments within thirty days from 
the date of the decree herein, or if not within that time, the plaintiff may be permitted to pay 
the said taxes and assessments, at which point plaintiff will have a right to a judgment for that 
amount. 
18. The defendants have some outstanding liens on other debts upon the property. 
It is reasonable that the defendants be permitted to clear any outstanding liens, judgments or 
debts upon the property within thirty days, or, if not with that time the plaintiff may be 
permitted to pay the liens, judgments or debts, at which point plaintiff will have a right to a 
judgment for that amount. 
19. The defendants, by letter, Exhibit 6, have admitted that plaintiff is entitled to 
a credit of $15,036.00 against the purchase price. The plaintiff is, in fact, entitled to such a 
credit against the purchase price under the terms of her agreement with the defendants. It is 
reasonable that the jury be allowed to determine if the plaintiff is entitled to additional credits 
to her equity as a result of rent payments from July 31, 1994, to the date she was ejected. 
20. It is reasonable that the jury be permitted to determine what other damages, if 
any, were sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendants' refusal to timely comply with 
the plaintiff s tender. 
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21. The water historically delivered to the premises by the Boulder Farmstead 
Water Company is appurtenant to the land, but is delivered by said company on the basis of 
shares owned by individual owners. The shares owned do not give the owner a certain or 
proportionate quantity of water, but rather a right to water. The water delivered is metered and 
paid for on separate schedules and at a separate rate for water that is considered "commercial" 
as distinguished from that which is considered "residential." According to the president of the 
water company, Mark Nelson, who testified in this trial, the water serving this property is 
"commercial" water owned on the books of the company by Howard and Ida Church and David 
and Gloria Baldwin. The Churches are the parents of Mrs. Baldwin. Baldwins received title 
to Churches' interest by a deed in May, 1995, and, therefore, presumably can have a new share 
issued either in their names or in the name of the plaintiff. 
22. The water connections to the property were connected in the following 
sequence: 
a. The old motel in approximately 1968. 
b. A mobile home, which preceded the home on the adjacent property to 
the east of the subject property which was owned by the Churches. 
c. The service station which ultimately became the cafe. 
It is reasonable that the water interest of the defendants, as represented by their stock 
ownership in the Boulder Farmstead Water Company, be divided between the plaintiff and 
defendants, and it is reasonable that the defendants be required to secure a conveyance of such 
interest to the plaintiff. It is further reasonable that until such time as the defendants can secure 
a division of such share and a recognition of such right by the water company, the water 
ownership of the share representation be awarded to and controlled by the plaintiff, and the 
plaintiffs right to the water shall be superior to that of the defendants; however, it is reasonable 
that the plaintiff be ordered not to interfere with the manner in which water is delivered to the 
residence of the defendants through the property awarded to her herein, until an adequate 
alternate source of water or alternate route for the service line to the defendants' residence can 
be acquired. 
23. There is located upon the property certain underground storage tanks which may 
violate state and federal environmental standards. It is reasonable that the defendants be 
required to remove such fixtures at their expense and bring the property in compliance with the 
law. It is reasonable that the defendants be allowed until July 1, 1996, to remove the said tanks, 
render the property environmentally safe, and comply with the law. Should the defendants' fail 
to do so, and if the plaintiff should be required to do so, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover 
from the defendants the cost of bringing the property into compliance, together with all penalties 
that may be assessed for failure to make a timely removal and compliance. It is reasonable that 
the defendants be ordered to conduct such tank removal and land compliance requirements in 
a prompt and orderly manner so as to interrupt and interfere with the plaintiffs use of the 
property as little as possible. 
24. The plaintiff is entitled to prompt possession of the premises. It is reasonable 
that the defendants be allowed thirty days within which to remove their property from the 
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premises, but it is further reasonable that they be ordered to return the premises to the plaintiff 
in as good condition in which they received it in March of 1995. 
25. The parties, by stipulation, have agreed that the question of reasonable attorney 
fees be tried to the Court in a separate evidentiary hearing to be conducted at a time and place 
convenient to the Court and to the parties, and that the determination of the Court in this regard 
be made part of the judgment and decree entered herein. 
26. It is reasonable that this decree and judgment be made final in accordance with 
Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, except for the questions reserved under paragraphs 17, 
20, 21 and 22 of these findings. The Court shall reserve entering an amended judgment in this 
case, based on a subsequent evidentiary hearing, should one be required to resolve the issues 
reserved under such paragraphs, including the award of attorney fees and costs, which such seem 
appropriate. 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The issues pertaining to the claim of specific performance are equitable issues 
and not legal issues and are reserved for the Court. 
2. The issues pertaining to the claim of specific performance were proved by 
overwhelming evidence to the extent that reasonable men could not differ, and, therefore, even 
if the jury were sitting in an advisory capacity, the Court, by clear and convincing evidence, 
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would be required to direct the jury to resolve such issues in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendants, and, therefore, the Court entered judgment consistant with this conclusion 
reserved for decision by the jury only certain issues of fact covered by separate jury instructions 
and verdict forms found elsewhere in the file of this case. 
3. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree of this Court ordering specific performance 
by a deed conveying marketable title to the following described property: 
Beginning 5 chains West of Sougheas corner of Section 26, 
Township 33 South, Range 4 East, and thence running North 
240 fee; thence East 157 feet; thence South 240 feet; thence 
West 157 feet to the point of beginning and containing .87 
acres. 
4. At all times during the tenure of the plaintiff as a tenant on the property of the 
defendants, the defendant David Baldwin was the agent of Gloria Baldwin and his actions were, 
in fact, the actions of himself and Gloria Baldwin. 
5. Because of partial performance and the written documents signed by the parties 
to be charged, the statute of frauds is not an issue or a defense in this case. 
6. The parties are entitled to have a judgment and decree entered consistent with 
the Court's Findings of Fact and the verdict reached by the jury, to wit $8,000.00 awarded to 
the plaintiff. 
7. The Court concludes that the language in Exhibit No. 2 is consistent with an 
option to purchase and inconsistent with a right of first refusal. 
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8. The relationship of the agreements, Exhibits 1 and 2, is ambiguous, and the 
language of paragraph 3 of Exhibit 2 is ambiguous, and the Court has allowed parol evidence 
on these issues to determine the intent of the parties; and the Court concludes as a matter of law 
that Exhibits 1 and 2 are part of the same agreement, Exhibit 2 being a modification of Exhibit 
1, and that paragraph 3 of Exhibit 2 was intended to grant to the plaintiff an option to purchase. 
9. The tender of the plaintiff was adequate and any objections that defendants may 
have had to that tender were waived according to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-3. 
10. At all times mentioned to the issues of this case, the defendant Gloria Baldwin 
is estopped from denying that David Baldwin, her husband, was her agent. 
11. The water was appurtenant to the land and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a 
conveyance of sufficient water to operate and maintain the property conveyed, which the Court 
concludes as a matter of law to be one-half of that owned in the Boulder Farmstead Water 
Company. 
12. It is reasonable that the plaintiff be awarded a Decree of Specific performance 
requiring the defendants to convey to the plaintiff a good and sufficient marketable title to said 
property. 
13. It is reasonable that the plaintiff and defendnat each pay one-half of the cost of 
an owner's policy of title insurance. 
14. It is reasonable that the defendants be permitted to pay all delinquent taxes and 
assessments within thirty days from the date of the decree herein, or if not within that time, the 
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plaintiff may be permitted to pay the said taxes and assessments at which point plaintiff will have 
a right to a judgment for that amount. 
15. The plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees. 
16. The plaintiff is entitled to costs. 
DATED this day of December, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
TIMOTHY WILLARDSON, for: 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and 
RICHARD W. DAYNES (5686), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Pruvo, Utah 3*1603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (301) 377-4991 
Our File No. 21,741 
Attomevs for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA 
BALDWIN, 
Defendants. 
PARTIAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
•-.,. Case No. 9306CC024 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
This matter having come on regularly for trial before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
Judge, siting wuh an advisory jury en quesiions of equity and presiding at a trial by jury on 
maciers o:' law as distinguished from ix\^i:trz of equity; and ci:e Colin having convened on the 
27th day of November, 1995, for the purpose of such trial, and the trial having continued 
through November 28, 29, and 30, 1995; and a jury having bra impaneled on the 27th day of 
November, which jury heard all factual questions; and the plaintiff having been represented by 
her attorneys, Jackson Howard and Richard W. Daynes of the law firm of Howard Lewis & 
Petersen; and the defendants having appeared in person and having been represented by their 
attorney Timothy Willardson of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer and Dahle; and the Court 
having heard testimony, and having received evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree in the above entitled 
case. 
The court now enters its Judgment and Decree: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded an order of specific performance ordering the 
defendants to reconvey a good and sufficient marketable title to the plaintiff of the following 
described property: 
Beginning 5 chains West of Southeast corner of Section 26, 
Township 33 South, Range 4 East, and thence running North 
240 feet; thence East 157 feet; thence South 240 feet; thence 
West 157 feet to the point of beginning and containing .87 
acres. 
2. Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the cost of an Owner's policy of title 
insurance. 
3. The plaintiff is to pay to the defendant the sum of $40,000.00 for said property 
less $15,036.00 the amount of earned equity admitted by the defendants and less $8,000.00, the 
amount of damages awarded by the jury. 
.4. The defendants are ordered to pay all delinquent taxes against said property. 
5. The plaintiff is awarded one-half of the water represented by the defendants' 
water share or shares in the Boulder Farmstead Water Company, and the defendants are ordered 
to secure the transfer of such water to the plaintiff. 
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6. The defendants are ordered to bring the said property into compliance with State 
and Federal requirements by July 1, 1996. This is to be done as quickly as possible and with 
the least interruption in time and inconvenience as possible. 
7. The defendants are allowed until January 15, 1996, to remove their personal 
property from the premises and they are ordered to restore said premises to the condition 
existing when they took possession of said premises in March, 1995. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded possession on January 15, 1996. 
9. The court reserves jurisdiction to conduct evidentiary hearings on attorney fees, 
environmental compliances, water rights, marketable title, and matters pertaining to the 
designated subjects. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to costs. 
DATED this / f day of December, 1995. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this M ^ day of December, 1995. 
Timothey Willardson 
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle 
IO885 South State 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
SECRETARY 
'VI <Ui 0 L. 
J:\JH\JONE-PARJUD 
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and 
RICHARD W. DAYNES (5686), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
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Our File No. 21,741 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA 
BALDWIN, 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED PARTIAL 
JUDGiMENT AND DECREE 
Case No. 930600024 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
This matter having come on regularly for trial before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
Judge, sitting with an advisory jury on questions of equity and presiding at a trial by jury on 
matters of law as distinguished from matters of equity; and the Court having convened on the 
27th day of November, 1995, for the purpose of such trial, and the trial having continued 
through November 28, 29, and 30, 1995; and a jury having ben impaneled on the 27th day of 
November, which jury heard all factual questions; and the plaintiff having been represented by 
her attorneys, Jackson Howard and Richard W. Daynes of the law firm of Howard Lewis & 
Petersen; and the defendants having appeared in person and having been represented by their 
attorney Timothy Willardson of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer and Dahle; and the Court 
having heard testimony, and the Court on the \y^^^ day of January, 1996, having received 
evidence, and the Court having taken testimony and evidence on the issue of attorney fees and 
receiving the bill of costs and affidavit of payment of taxes, now being fully advised in the 
premises, makes and enters its Supplemental and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree in the above entitled case. 
THE COURT ENTERS THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENT AND DECREE: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded an order of specific performance ordering the 
defendants to convey a good and sufficient marketable title to the plaintiff of the following 
described property: 
Beginning 5 chains West of Southeast corner of Section 26, 
Township 33 South, Range 4 East, and thence running North 
240 feet; thence East 157 feet; thence South 240 feet; thence 
West 157 feet to the point of beginning and containing .87 
acres. 
2. Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the cost of an Owner's policy of title 
insurance. 
3. The plaintiff is awarded $8,000.00 in damages as set forth by the jury; 
$25,000.00 in attorney fees pursuant to the hearing of January 22, 1996 before this Court; and 
$839.19 in costs pursuant to the Bill of Costs filed with this Court and $100.00 for the title 
insurance. The commitment for title insurance cost $200.00 of which defendants were ordered 
to pay half. The plaintiff is awarded $15,036.00 in earned equity admitted by the defendants. 
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The plaintiff has paid defendants' delinquent taxes together with penalties and interest and 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment for those taxes which amount is $1,493.68. This amounts to a 
total award of $50,468.87. This applied toward the purchase price and fair market value of 
$40,000.00, for said property amounts to a remainder of $10,568.87 for which plaintiff is 
awarded judgment bearing interest at the legal rate. 
4. The plaintiff is awarded one-half of the water represented by the defendants' 
water share or shares in the Boulder Farmstead Water Company, and the defendants are ordered 
to secure the transfer of such water to the plaintiff. 
5. The defendants are ordered to bring the said property into compliance with State 
and Federal EPA and other environmental requirements by July 1, 1996. This is to be done as 
quickly as possible and with the least interruption in time and inconvenience as possible. 
6. The defendants are allowed until January 15, 1996, to remove their personal 
property from the premises and they are ordered to restore said premises to the condition 
existing when they took possession of said premises in March, 1995. 
7. The plaintiff is awarded possession on January 15, 1996. 
8. The court reserves jurisdiction to conduct evidentiary hearings on attorney fees, 
environmental compliances, water rights, marketable title, and matters pertaining to the 
designated subjects. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to costs. 
10. The retains jurisdiction to deal with issues remaining unresolved, in particular 
those questions included in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above. In all other matters this judgment 
shall be deemed final within the pursue of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
February. DATED this A. day of ay, 1996. 
APPROVED AS TO FOR 
5THY JvnGUET^Tt±AR^SON^ian___^ 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE, P.C. ~ ~^ 
Attorney for Defendants 
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ADDENDUM 15 
a 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
INTRODUCTION 
Members of the jury, I would like to thank you for your 
attention during this trial. I will now explain to you the rules 
of law that you must follow and apply in deciding this case. 
When I have finished you will go to the jury room and begin your 
discussions, what we call your deliberations- Please pay 
attention to the legal instructions I am about to give you. This 
is an extremely important part of this trial. 
You are not to single out one instruction alone as 
stating the law, but must consider the instructions as a whole. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance 
as to their relative importance. If a direction or an idea is 
stated more than once, or in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is 
intended and none must be inferred by you. 
INSTRUCTION NO. | (N 
EXPERT WITNESS 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the 
opinions of a witness to be received as evidence. An exception 
to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses 
who, by education, study and experience, have become expert in 
some art, science, profession or calling, may state opinions as 
to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an 
expert, so long as it. is material and relevant to the case. You 
should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any, 
given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the 
weight you think it deserves. If you should decide that the 
opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient 
education and experience, or if you should conclude that the 
reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that 
such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard 
the opinion entirely. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J / A 
You are instructed that the Court has resolved the issues 
pertaining to the plaintiff's claim that she is entitled to 
specific performance. In that regard, the Court has found that the 
plaintiff is entitled to have the defendants convey to her a 
marketable title to the property which she had a right to purchase. 
The Court has also made rulings on the issues of compliance with 
State and Federal environmental requirements, and has resolved the 
question of providing water to the premises. The Court has further 
determined, as a matter of law, that the defendants were either 
required to accept or reject the plaintiff's tender of $40,000.00, 
and the Court finds that the fair market value of the property as 
of May 7, 1993 was $40,000.00. The^eluie, tge~ToSrtriiare^ 
fehe--~f-a^rg—maorket—vai^tiQ of••• the—pxopesfty-was $40,0&0-H&K The Court 
will require that you answer only questions pertaining to the 
plaintiff's damages, if any. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
The Court shall submit the matter to you solely on the 
question of damages, if any, to be awarded the plaintiff. In 
considering what damages the plaintiff may have sustained in this 
case, you may consider what profits, if any, the plaintiff may have 
made during the period March 1995 through November 29, 1995, less 
whatever income she received from other sources. You may also 
consider what other loss of income she may have been deprived of by 
reason of the failure of the defendants to deliver possession, such 
as the rental income from her home in Salt Lake City, if any, had 
she not been required to live in said house because of her 
inability to purchase the property in Boulder, Utah. 
The Court has determined that the defendants have acknowledged 
that the plaintiff has an accrued equity against the purchase price 
of $15,036.00 as of July 31, 1994; however, you may consider the 
amount of increased equity she may have earned by reason of rental 
payments from July 31, 1994 through December of 1994. 
You may also consider damage, if any, she may have sustained 
by reason of the taking of possession of the premises by the 
defendants. 
In considering damages, if any, you must bear in mind that 
plaintiff has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of 
the evidence and that the other instructions that I have given you 
are to be followed in reaching such determination. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 'y^ 
FAILURE TO PRODUCE STRONGER EVIDENCE 
If you find that it was within the power of a party to 
produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence than that which 
was offered on a material point, you may view with distrust any 
weaker and less satisfactory evidence actually offered, unless 
such failure is satisfactorily explained. 
^ ^ ^ "
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INSTRUCTION NO, / ^ 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the 
burden of proof rests upon a certain party, I mean that unless 
the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, you shall find that the same is not true. If the 
evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any 
allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been 
proved. 
\'}Q fiu\ -ecT^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
The term "preponderance of the evidence'1 means that 
evidence which, in your minds, seems to be of the greater weight; 
the most convincing and satisfactory., The preponderance of the 
evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the 
amount of the testimony, but by the convincing character of the 
testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you, the 
jury. 
INSTRUCTION NO ._^ r 
EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified 
falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard the entire 
testimony of witness, except as that witness may have been 
corroborated by other credible evidence. 
^ S S ^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
You may believe that a witness, on some former 
occasion, made statements inconsistent with that witness' 
testimony given here in this case. 
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to 
entirely disregard the present testimony. The effect of such 
evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to 
determine. 
i( 
INSTRUCTION NO. n 
CHARTS AND SUMMARIES 
Certain charts and summaries have been shown to you in 
order to help explain the facts disclosed by the books, records, 
and other documents which are in evidence in the case. However, 
such charts or summaries are not in and of themselves evidence or 
proof of any facts. If such charts or summaries do not correctly 
reflect facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, you 
should disregard them. 
In other words, charts or summaries are used only as a 
matter of convenience. If you find they are not in truth 
summaries of facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, 
you are to disregard them entirely. 
w W W S ^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. (K 
RESORT TO CHANCE 
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by 
resorting to chance. If you decide that,a party is entitled to 
recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be 
awarded. It would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to 
take the independent estimate of each juror, then total the 
estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the 
average the amount of your award. Each of you may express your 
own independent judgment as to what the amount should be. It is 
your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test 
them in the light of the law and the evidence and, after due 
consideration, determine which, if any, of such individual 
estimates is proper. 
r, e C G<*f~* . / ' 
INSTRUCTION NO. a 
SYMPATHY, PREJUDICE, PASSION 
This case must not be decided for or against anyone 
because you feel sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your 
sworn duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law, 
without regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice. 
INSTRUCTION NO. '2-C 
JURORS TO DELIBERATE AND AGREE IF POSSIBLE 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another 
and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if your 
individual judgment allows such agreement. You each must decide 
the case for yourself, but only after consideration of the case 
with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to change an 
opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not 
surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight 
of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely 
because of the opinion of the other jurors. 
INSTRUCTION NO, ^ / 
This case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a general verdict as is sometimes 
done, but it will be your function to make findings of fact by answering special interrogatories 
or questions which are submitted to you. In making your findings of act, you should bear in 
mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming the fact to be 
true, and he must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. Before you may answer "yes" 
to any question submitted to you, you must find the same to be true by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The agreement of six of the jurors is required to answer any question, and at least 
six of the jurors must agree that the answer to the question should be "yes" before that answer 
may be made. 
Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one of your number to act as a 
foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. 
As soon as you have answered the special interrogatories or questions, you shall have the special 
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then shall return it to this room. 
rt 
Instructions numbered 1 through ^X / given to the jury this 3o day of 
November, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR COUNTY OF 
STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
District Judge 
ADA JONES 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID BALDWIN and 
GLORIA BALDWIN 
Defendant, 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CASE NO. 930600024 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: 
Attached hereto are jury instructions, number 1 to 
number , inclusive, as given by the Court in this case 
Dated this day of , 19 . 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
It is the duty of this Court to instruct you in the law 
that applies to this case, and it is your duty to follow the law, 
regardless of what you believe it is or ought to be. It is your 
exclusive right to determine the facts in the case, and then to 
wei.gh the evidence for that purpose. 
You authority must be exercised with sincere judgment, 
sound discretion, and in accordance with these rules of law. 
INSTRUCTION NO. y 
The Court will be called upon to pass on the question of 
whether or not offered evidence might be admitted. You should 
not draw an inference from my rulings. Whether evidence is adnnss 
ible is a question of law. 
I do not determine what weight you should give evidence; 
nor the credibility of the witnesses. 
It is the duty of counsel to object when testimony or other 
evidence is offered, which he believes is not admissible. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~> 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. You have a right to 
take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result 
of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify 
fairly, if any, is shown. 
You may consider the witnesses 1 deportment, the reason-
ableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, 
or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to 
understand, and their capacity to remember. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
In determining the credibility of a witness you may consider 
any matter to prove or disprove his thruthfulness, including the 
following: 
His demeanor and manner while testifying. 
His capacity and opportunity to perceive, recollect or to 
communicate. 
His character for honesty, veracity, a bias, interest or 
other motive. 
A statement previously made by him that is consistent or 
inconsistent with his testimony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. '.; 
You must not consider as evidence any statement of counsel 
made during the trial; however, if counsel for the parties stipulate 
you will regard that fact as being conclusively proved. 
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you 
must not speculate as to what the answer might have been or as to 
the reason for the objection. 
You must not consider any evidence that was rejected or any 
evidence that was stricken. 
A question is not evidence, and may be considered only as 
it supplies meaning to the answer. 
INSTRUCTION NO. > 
You are not to decide an issue by the simple process of 
counting the number of witnesses that testified on the opposing sides 
The final test is not the number of witnesses, but in the convincing 
force of the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. . 7 
If, during this trial, I say or do anything which suggests to yoi 
that I favor the position of either party, don't be influenced by such 
suggestions. 
I do not intend to indicate any opinion as to which party should 
prevail. You are the exclusive judge of the facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. I 
This is an action to enforce a real estate contract. This action is brought by Ada Jones 
against David Baldwin and Gloria Baldwin. The plaintiff claims that she entered into a lease 
agreement with the said defendants which agreement contained an option to purchase. She 
contends that she entered upon the premises located in Boulder, Utah, and operated a cafe 
thereon called the Burr Trail Cafe from the period of June 6, 1984, through the year 1994. The 
plaintiff contends that on May 7, 1993, she exercised her option to purchase in writing, by 
giving the defendants notice of said election, and the defendants rejected such tender on the sole 
basis that they could not provide culinary water to the premises. The plaintiff contends that the 
defendants made no other objection to the tender. Immediately thereafter she brought this suit 
for specific performance. The plaintiff further claims that in February, 1995, the defendants 
ejected her from the premises and took dominion and control over the said property. 
The plaintiff contends that she sustained damages by reason of the failure of the 
defendants to promptly honor her election of her offer to purchase. 
The plaintiff further contends that on May 7, 1993, she exercised her option to purchase 
in writing, by giving the defendants notice of said election, and the defendants rejected such 
tender on the sole basis that they could not provide culinary water to the premises. The plaintiff 
contends that the defendants made no other objection to the tender. 
The defendants contend that the right of the plaintiff was not an option to purchase, but 
rather, a first right of refusal in the event someone else purchased; and the defendants further 
contend that the defendant Gloria Baldwin was not a party to the said agreement and never 
consented to the agreement, and that the agreement is not binding upon her. 
The defendants deny each and every claim of the plaintiff. 
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Denver C. Snuffer #3031 
Timothy Miguel Willardson # 4443 
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle 
10885 South State Street 
Sandv, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OFUTAH 
ADA JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA BALDWIN, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 93-0600024 
Hon. Don V. Tibbs 
Please find attached Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions. Depending on the Court's standard 
instructions, the proposed instructions of the plaintiff which the Court elects to give and the 
evidence introduced at trial, defendant may propose additional instructions. 
DATED: Wednesday, November 22, 1995. 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
Attorney for Defendants 
DUTY OF THE COURT 
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty, as jurors, to 
follow the law as I state it to you, regardles^ot what you personally believe the law is or ought to 
be. Even if you do not like the laws thaprtiust be applied, you must use them. On the other hand, it 
is your exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and weigh the evidence 
for that purpose. Your responsibility must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound discretion 
and honest deliberation. 
References: MUJI 2.2, 
JIFU No. 1.1 (195»x 
It is the duty of the court to instruct you in the law that applies in thjs^ase, and it is your duty as 
jurors to follow the law as the court states it to you, regardlessofwhat you personally believe the 
law is or ought to be. On the other hand, it is your exclusjye'province to determine the facts in the 
case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for thatjatlfpose. 
References: BAJI-1 
Rule 51, U.R.C.P. 
People vs. Chadwich. 7 Utah 134, 25J&737, Hawlev v. Cory 9 UTAH 175, 33 p. 695. 
The purpose of the coun's instruction is to instruct you as to the applicable law so that you may 
arrive at a just and lawful verdict. Whether some instructions apply will depend upon what you 
find to be the facts. Even though I have instructed you on various subjects you must not treat the 
instructions as indicating the coun's opinion on how you should decide any issue in this case. 
References* BAIT-^  
Hillvard v.'Utah Bv Products Co.. 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287. 
Upon retiring to the jury room you will select on of your number to act as foreman, who will 
preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. This is a civil action and 
six members of the jury may find and return a verdict./As soon as six or more of you shall have 
agreed upon a verdict, you shall have it signed and dated by your foreman and then shall return it 
to this room. , / 
/ 
Note: Rule 47(q) U.R.C.P. permits different/number to return verdict. 
References: BAJI-9 
You should not consider as evidence any statements of counsel made during the trial, unless such 
statement was made as an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts. 
You must not consider for any purpose any offer or evidence that was rejected, or any evidence 
that was stricken out by the coun; such matter is to be treated as though you never had known it. 
You are to decide this case solely upon the evidence that has been received by the court, and the 
inferences that you may reasonably draw therefrom, and in accordance with the law as herein 
stated. 
References: BAJI 23 
Arnett v. Scherer. 142 Ore. 494, 20JP.2d 803. 
When an attempt is made to impeach a witness by showing that his general reputation in the 
community where he resides for truth, honesty and integrity is bad, it is proper for you to consider 
not only such evidence and all evidence of a contrary reputation, but also the fact, if it be a fact, 
that among persons who know the witness, his reputation for truth, honesty and integrity has not 
been discussed or questioned. The fact that a person's character in such respect has not been 
questioned or discussed may support an inference of good reputation. 
References: BAJI 34-C 
State v. Hansen. 40 Utah 418, 122 P. 375; State v. Hougensen. 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229. 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witness and the weight of the evidence. In 
judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a right to take into 
consideration their bias, their interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack 
thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses deportment upon the 
witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the 
want of it, their opponunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. 
You should consider these matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you 
may believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements. 
References: BAJI 28 
Gittens v. Lundberg. 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115. 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In 
judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right to take into 
consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and am^friotive or lack of motive to testify 
fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the reasonableness of 
their statements, their apparent frankness or candor^of the want of it, their opportunity to know, 
their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should consider these matters you 
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements. 
References: MUJI 2.9 
JIFUNo. 3.2 (1957) 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements inconsistent with that 
witness' testimony given here in this case. / 
That does not necessarily mean that you are^dquired to entirely disregard the present testimony. 
The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to determine. 
References: MUJI2.10 
JEFUNos. 3.10, 3.11 (1957) 
A witness may be impeached by contradictory evidence or by evidence that his general reputation 
for truth, honesty or integrity is bad or by evidence that on some former occasion he made 
statements or conducted himself in a manner inconsistent with his present testimony. The effect, if 
any, of impeachment upon the credibility of the'witness is for you to determine. 
References: BAJI 34 
Black v. Rockv Mtn. Bell Tel. Co.. 26#tah 451, 73 P. 514, 74-24-1 U.C.A., 1953. 
EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you may 
disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been corroborated 
by other credible evidence. 
References: iMUJI2.ll 
Gittens v. Lundbera, 3 Utah 2d 392,,284 P.2d 1115 (1955) 
JIFU No. 3.12 (1957) 
BAJI No. 2.22 (1986). Reprinted'with permission; copyright 1986 West Publishing Company 
(~L 
If you believe any witness has willfully,testified falsely as to any material matter, you may 
disregard the entire testimony of suchr witness, except as he may have been corroborated by other 
credible evidence. 
References: BAJ1 27 
Gitten v. Lundberg, 3 Utah'2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115. 
3 
If you should find that it was within the power or a party to produce stronger and more satisfactory 
evidence than that which was offered on a material point, you may view with distrust any weaker 
and less satisfactory evidence actually offered by him (or her) on that point, unless such failure is 
satisfactorily explained. 
References: BAJI 30 
Cram v. Reynolds. 55 Utah 384. 186 P. 100. 
Note: Care should be taken that the instruction is not so used that it may be construed to be a 
comment on the evidence Morton v. Hood, 105 Utah 484, 143 P.2d 434. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of proof rests upon a certain party, or that 
a party must prove a certain proposition, or that you.must find a certain proposition to be true, I 
mean that unless the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall 
find that the same is not true. 
References: MUJI2.16 
JIFUNo. 2.1 (1957) 
is 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
The term svpreponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your minds, seems to be 
of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of the evidence is 
not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but by the 
convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you. If the 
evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that such 
allegation has not been proved. 
References: MUJI2.18 
JIFUNo. 3.1 (1957) 
iT 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greaterweight of the evidence, that is, such 
evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, is more^convincing as to its truth. 
References: BAJI21-A / 
Hickev v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co.. 29 Utah"392. 82 P. 29; Alvardo v. Tucker. 2 Utah 2d 
16, 268 P.2d 986. 
a 
CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE 
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the witnesses, and 
have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted into evidence. 
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be considered by you in 
arriving at your verdict. You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made 
during trial. 
References: MUJI 2.4 
JIFU No. 3.6 (1957) 
You are to consider only the evidence in the case. But in your consideration of the evidence you 
are not limited to the bald statements of the witnesses. In other words, you are not limited to what 
you see and hear the witnesses testify to. You are permitted to draw, from facts which you find 
have been proved, such reasonable inferences as seem justified in the light of your experience. 
Inferences are deductions or conclusions which reason and common sense lead the jury to draw 
from facts which have been established by the evidence in the case. 
Unless and until outweighed by evidence in the case to the contrary, you may find that official duty 
has been regularly performed; that private transactions have been fair and regular; that the ordinary 
course of business or employment has been followed; that things have happened according to the 
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life; and that the law has been obeyed. 
n 
I have not intended by anything I have said or done, or by any questions that I have asked, to 
suggest how you should decide any questions of fact, or that I believe or disbelieve any witness. 
If anything I have done or said has seemed so to indicate, you must disregard it and form your 
own opinion. 
References: BAJI 23 
Amett v. Scherer. 142 Ore. 494. 20 P.2d 803. 
PROVINCE OF JURY 
It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should return one verdict or another in this 
case. Please understand that I do not wish in any way to influence your verdict. It would be 
improper for me to do so. Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot participate in 
that decision in any way. Please disregard anything that I may have said or done if it made you 
think that I preferred one verdict over another, that I believed one witness over another, or that I 
considered any piece of evidence more important than another. 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is your duty to render a just verdict 
based upon the facts and the evidence. 
References: MUJI 2.6 
JIFUNo. 1.4(1957) 
<£ 
ATTITUDE AND CONDUCT OF JURORS 
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It will not be 
productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of your 
opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When that 
happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede from an announced 
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this 
matter, but are judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the ascenainment and declaration 
of the truth and the administration of justice. 
References: MUJI 2.7 
JIFU No. 1.8 (1957) 
x^ 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of deposition. You are not to 
discount this testimony for the sole reason that it comes to you in the form of a deposition. It is 
entitled to the same consideration as if the witness had personally appeared. 
References: MUJI2.12 
JIFUNo. 3.3 (1957) 
13 
STATEMENT OF OPINION 
An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does not purport to be based on 
actual knowledge. In determining whether a particular statement was a statement of fact or merely 
an expression of opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which it was 
made, the manner in which the statement was made and the ordinary effect of the words used. You 
may also consider the relationship of the parties and the subject matter with which the statement 
was concerned. 
References: MUJI2.13 
BAJI No. 9.51 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright 1986 West Publishing Company 
<2-f 
EXPERT WITNESS 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as evidence. 
An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by education, 
study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling, may state 
opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long as it is 
material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any, 
given for it. You are not bound by such air opinion. Give it the weight you think it deserves. If you 
should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient education and 
experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinions are not 
sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion 
entirely. 
References: MUJI2.14 
JIFU No. 3.7 (1957) 
Fed. Jury Prac. & Instructions § 72.08 (1987 & Supp. 1991). Reprinted with permission; 
copyright 1987 West Publishing Company 
^ 
TAKING OF NOTES 
I have noticed that some of you have been taking notes during the testimony. The use of notes in 
the jury room to refresh your memory is perfecdy acceptable. But let me caution you not to rely 
excessively upon your notes. You must arrive at a verdict independently, after consultation with 
the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your own memory of the evidence. One juror's 
opinion should not be given excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken notes. 
References: MUJI 2.20 
JURORS TO DELIBERATE AND AGREE IF POSSIBLE 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an 
agreement, if your individual judgment allows such agreement. You each must decide the case for 
yourself, but only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate 
to change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not surrender your 
honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a 
verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors. 
References: MUJI 2.25 
JDFUNo. 1.7 (1957) 
RESORT TO CHANCE 
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to chance. If you decide that a 
party is entitled to recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be awarded. It 
would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror, then 
total the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the amount of your 
award. Each of you may express your own independent judgment as to what the amount should 
be. It is your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light of the law 
and the evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such individual 
estimates is proper. 
References: MUJI 2.26 
JIFUNo. 1.13 (1957) 
ISSUES IN THE CASE 
The plaintiff claims that the plaintiff and the defendant have a contract, and that as a result of the 
defendant's failure to perform the defendant's obligations under the contract, the plaintiff suffered 
loss in one or more of the following respects: 
1) On the May 7, 1993, Ms. Jones informed Mr. Baldwin that she was going to buy then-
property. In June, 1993, Ms. Jones received a letter from Mr. Baldwin stating that the property 
would not be sold. Ms. Jones claims that she is entitled to specific performance of the sales 
agreement and a conveyance to her of the premises, including appurtenances at a price of fair 
market value, which are implicit in the agreement; and 
2) The lease option agreement is ambiguous and should be rewritten, in favor of Ms. Jones 
(because Mr. Baldwin wrote the lease document) to remove what was written and substitute words 
that require that (a) whether or not the property is sold is up to Ms. Jones, (b) the purchase price 
will be $40,000 unless two out of three appraisers (with Baldwins paying half) agree on a different 
price, (c) the sale must be done within 30 days after a price is set, (d) price will be paid in cash 
within 30 days after the price is fixed, (e) Baldwins must guaranty that Ms. Jones gets clear title 
with no encumbrances, (f) each side has to pay half the cost of a survey to determine what property 
is being sold, and (g) Ms. Jones gets the water rights for the property; and 
3) Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin have breached the existing agreement to sell the property and Ms. 
Jones should be able to recover all of the profits and equity that she has lost by Baldwins taking 
back their property; and 
4) Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin promised Ms. Jones that she could buy the property that she was 
leasing knowing that Ms. Jones would rely on that promise. Ms. Jones did rely on the promise 
and has been hurt because she made lease payments and improvements on the property that she 
would not have made without the promise, so Baldwins should have to sell their property and also 
pay Ms. Jones money for whatever damages she proves at trial; and 
5) Ms. Jones gave the Baldwins a benefit in the form of improvements and in increased 
business and goodwill, Baldwins were aware of the benefit they were receiving, Baldwins have 
retained those benefits after promising Ms. Jones that she could purchase the property. Under the 
circumstances, to allow defendants to retain, without payment, the improvements and increased 
business and goodwill of the cafe which was produced by plaintiff would be unfair. 
The defendant denies that the defendant did any of the things claimed by the plaintiff or that the 
defendant acted improperly, or that the defendant's claimed actions or omissions were a legal cause 
of the plaintiffs claimed loss. 
The defendant further claims that: 
1) It would be unfair to take their property away from them under the circumstances in this 
case; and 
2) The agreement on which Ms. Jones seeks to rely is covers so few of the crucial points 
necessary to an agreement to sell property that it would be unfair to enforce it and a contract; the 
thing that Ms. Jones is relying on is just an agreement to agree on something if a sale is considered 
in the future; and 
3. Because sales of land are so important, agreements about land sales must be fully written 
down. This was not so it is not enforceable; and 
4. Ms. Jones waited to tell Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin that she thought she could force a sale of 
their property until it was too late for Baldwins to correct her, so that it would be unfair to make 
Baldwins sell their property: and 
5. Ms. Jones has not given Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin anything of value that would compensate 
for an agreement to sell their home and property; and 
6. Ms. Jones has, by waiting, or by her other actions, given up the right to insist that the 
property be sold. 
The defendant further denies that the plaintiff sustained damages. 
References: MUJI26.1 
IJI § 10.01. 
"50 
EXISTENCE OF VALID CONTRACT 
You are being asked to decide whether the plaintiff and the defendant had a valid contract for sale 
of Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin's home and their other property. 
A contract is an agreement between two or more competent parties for the performance of a specific 
act. It can also be an agreement not to do a certain act. 
To find the existence of a valid contract, you must find that all of the following occurred: 
1. The plaintiff made an offer to the defendant; and 
2. The defendant accepted the offer; and 
3. Each party gave something of value in return for what the party received. 
References: MUJI 26.2 
IJI § 10.2. Reprinted with permission: copyright 1991Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 
- 3 ^ 
SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS 
A contract may consist of several documents, several verbal agreements, or both. 
If you find that the second lease agreement refers to and describes the first lease agreement or the 
requirements of the water district or the environmental agencies, and you find that the plaintiff and 
the defendant intended to include those requirements as part of their agreement, then you may 
consider it to be a part of the contract. 
References: MUJI 26.5 
IJI § 10.06. 
OFFER 
An offer is a definite proposal to enter into a specific contract upon acceptance by the person 
receiving the offer. 
References: MUJI 26.7 
Engineering Assocs., Inc. v. Irving Place Assocs., Inc., 622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1979) 
IJI §§ 10.21, 10.22. 
^ 
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE 
To find that the plaintiff and the defendant had a valid contract, you must find that: 
1. The plaintiff communicated an offer to the defendant; and 
2. The defendant accepted the offer and communicated the acceptance to the plaintiff. 
Unless a particular mode of acceptance is specified by the offer, the acceptance does not need to be 
express or formal. Acceptance may be shown by writing, words, or conduct that indicates 
agreement to the offer. 
References: MUJI 26.6 
Walters v. National Beverages, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 301, 422 R2d 524 (1967) 
R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952) 
Crane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 774 P.2d 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 30 (1979) 
IJI § 10.20. 
REVOCATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF OFFER 
An offer made by one pany may be withdrawn at any time prior to its acceptance by the other 
party. Therefore, if you find the defendant withdrew or revoked the defendant's offer prior to the 
plaintiffs acceptance of the offer, or prior to the time the offer had been communicated to the 
plaintiff, then you must find that no valid contract was formed. 
References: MUJI 26.8 
IJI § 10.23. 
LAPSE OF OFFER 
If an offer does not specify a limited time by which it may be accepted, a contract may be formed 
only if the offer is accepted within a reasonable time. 
Therefore, if you find the offer does not specify a time limit for acceptance, and the offer was in 
fact accepted within a reasonable time, you must find that a valid contract was formed. However, if 
you find that the offer was not accepted within a reasonable time, then you must find that the offer 
had expired and that a contract had not been formed. 
References: MUJI 26.9 
IJI § 10.24. 
ACCEPTANCE 
To find that the defendant accepted the offer, you must find that the defendant did one of the 
following: 
'&• 
1. Communicated the defendant's acceptance to the plaintiff; or 
2. Performed the acts that the offer specified. Unless the offer specifies otherwise, acceptance of 
an offer may be made in writing, by spoken words, by actions, or by any other conduct that 
indicates an agreement to the terms of the offer. 
If you find that the defendant did not accept the offer, then you must find that no contract was 
formed. If you find that the defendant did accept the offer, then you must go on to consider the 
other issues. 
References: MUJI26.10 
Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971) 
R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 50 (1979) 
IJI § 10.30. 
-5 
COUNTEROFFER AND ACCEPTANCE 
For a binding contract to be formed, an offer must be accepted in its entirety. An offer cannot be 
accepted in pan and rejected in pan. 
If you find that the defendant proposed new terms, or rejected some terms of the offer, then you 
must find that a contract was not formed, but rather that the defendant made a counteroffer. 
However, if you find that the plaintiff accepted the terms of the defendant's counteroffer, then you 
must find that a contract was formed. 
References: MUJI26.11 
Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971) 
R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 58 (1979) 
IJI § 10.32. 
REJECTION OF OFFER 
As soon as the offeree rejects the entire offer, or any of its terms, an offer terminates. Once 
rejected, the offer may not be accepted later. 
References: MUJI 26.12 
IJI § 10.33. 
40 
CONSIDERATION 
If you find that the plaintiff did not give or agree to give the Baldwins something valuable, in 
addition to what Ms. Jones had to give them under the lease, then you must find that there was no 
contract for sale of the propeny. If you find that the plaintiff did give or agree to give the Baldwins 
something valuable, in addition to what Ms. Jones had to give them under the lease, then you must 
go on to consider the other issues. 
References: MUJI 26.14 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) 
Latimer v. Holladay, 103 Utah 152, 134 P.2d 183 (1943) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §71(1979) 
IJI § 10.50. 
4/ 
NEGOTIATIONS 
If the parties are merely negotiating the terms of an agreement, no contract has been formed. A 
contract is formed only if the parties have agreed to all of the essential elements of the agreement. 
Therefore, if you find that the parties had not reached agreement on any material term, you must 
find that no contract was formed. 
References: MUJI 26.16 
IJI § 11.10. 
AGREEMENT TO ALL MATERIAL TERMS 
The burden of proving that both parries agreed as to all material terms and conditions is on Ms. 
Jones, because she is the party claiming that there is a contract to sell the property. Therefore, if 
you find that the parties had not reached agreement on any material term, you must find that no 
contract was formed. 
References: B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 444, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (1972) 
Cal Wadsworth Construction v.City of St. George, 1995 WL 364067 (Utah 1995) 
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1992) 
43 
DEFINITION OF "MATERIAL" TERM 
An element or term of a contract is a material term of a contract if a reasonable person would not 
have made the contract unless a promise regarding that action or duty had been included. 
References: MUJI 26.40 
^ 
ASSENT TO DIFFERENT TERMS 
A contract is formed only if the parties have completely assented to identical terms. Therefore, if 
you find that the parties did not come to a complete understanding and agreement on any of the 
material terms of the contract, then you must find that no contract was formed. 
References: MUJI 26.17 
Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 714 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1979) 
m § l i . i i . 
IS 
MUTUAL MISTAKE 
When both parties, at the time of entering into a contract, share a mutual mistaJce about an 
assumption or a fact upon which they based the contract, and such assumption or fact has a 
material effect on the agreed performance, the contract is voidable. 
A mistake is a belief that is not in accord with the facts. 
When a contract is voidable, either party may choose to have the contract declared void. 
References: MUJI 26.18 
Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 151, 152 (1979) 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE, WHEN VOIDABLE 
A unilateral mistake is a mistake made by only one of the two parties to a contract. When the 
following four elements have been established, the contract may be voided: 
1. The unilateral mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to enforce the contract as actually 
made would be unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the unilateral mistake was made must relate to a material feature of the 
contract. 
3. Generally, the unilateral mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary 
diligence by the party making the mistake. 
4. It must be possible to give relief by way of rescinding the contract without serious prejudice to 
the other party, except the loss of the pany's bargain. In other words, it musfbe possible to return 
the party to the situation that existed before entering into the contract. 
References: iVIUJI 26.19 
John Call Ens'g v. Manti City Corp., 743 R2d 1205 (Utah 1987) 
Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813 (Utah 1968) 
SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE 
The plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff substantially performed the plaintiffs obligation to pay 
rent, insure the property, maintain the property, arid all of the other significant items in the lease 
agreement. Proof of substantial performance means that the plaintiff must prove all of the 
following: 
1. That the plaintiff performed substantially all of what the contract required. 
2. That the plaintiffs performance was so nearly equivalent to what was bargained for that it 
would be unreasonable, based on all the facts and circumstances, to deny the plaintiff the payment 
of the contract price, less any damages for the plaintiffs failure to perform the remainder of the 
contract terms. 
3. That the plaintiff acted in good faith, and did not intentionally fail to comply with the terms of 
the contract. 
If you find that the plaintiff has proved all three of these items, then you must find that the plaintiff 
is entitled to recover the contract price from the defendant, less any amount owing to the defendant 
resulting from the plaintiffs failure to perform all of the plaintiffs obligations under the contract. 
If you find that the plaintiff has not proved all of these items, then you must find the plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover the agreed contract price from the defendant'. 
References: MUJI 26.21 
IJI § 12.02. 
BREACH 
To prevail on the plaintiffs claim against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
breached the defendant's obligation under the contract by failing to give Ms. Jones the right of first 
refusal when Baldwins were ready, willing, and able to sell both the business and their home. 
References: 
IJI § 12.03. 
MUJI 26.22 
"CONDITION" DEFINED 
The obligation of a pany is conditional when the party's duty to perform the obligation depends 
the happening of an event, the occurrence of which may either be certain or uncenain. 
References: MUJI 26.26 
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224 (1979) 
IJI § 12.70. 
CONDITION PRECEDENT 
The defendant was not obligated to allow Ms. Jones to purchase their property until Mr. and Mrs. 
Baldwin had received a bona fide offer to purchase that property which they were ready, willing 
and able to accept. To prevail in the plaintiffs claim against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove 
that Baldwins had received a bona fide offer to purchase that property which they were ready, 
willing and able to accept that offer and that Baldwins then failed to allow Ms. Jones to purchase 
the property. 
References: MUJI 26.27 
IJI§ 12.71. 
"D 
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE 
The particular time of performance is not critical unless it is made so either by the express 
agreement of the parties or by the circumstances of the case. If the contractual obligation can be 
performed as well at one time as another, time is not critical. On the other hand, time is critical if, 
because of the subject matter or terms of the contract, or due to fluctuations in value, one party will 
incur substantial injury or financial loss due to delayed performance by the other unless time is 
treated as critical. If it is critical that performance take place at the agreed time, a late performance 
or offer of performance may be rejected. 
You must therefore decide whether the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant or the 
circumstances of this case required the plaintiff to pay rent, maintain the buildings, and do the other 
things required in the lease within the time specified in the contract. If you decide timely 
performance by the plaintiff was critical, you must find that late performance by the plaintiff could 
properly be rejected by the defendant. If you decide it was not critical the plaintiff perform within 
the time specified in the contract, you must find that any reasonable delay in the plaintiffs 
performance did not give the defendant the right to reject that performance. 
References: MUJI 26.28 
IJI § 12.90. 
REASONABLE TIME FOR PERFORMANCE 
If a contract does not specify a time by which an act is to be done, the act must be performed 
within a reasonable time. 
In determining whether the plaintiff paid her rent, maintained the property, and did the other things 
she was required to do within a reasonable time, you must consider the situation of the parties, the 
nature of the transaction, and the circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs performance. If you 
find the plaintiff completed her performance within a reasonable time, you must find the plaintiff 
performed the plaintiffs obligations under the contract. 
References: MUJI 26.29 
IJI§ 12.92. 
DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
Whether expressed or not, every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing with respect to dealings between the parties. The parties to a contract must deal fairly and 
honestly with each other. Nevenheless, this duty of good faith and fair dealing does not create any 
implied obligations contradictory to the express provisions of the contract. Also, the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing does not mean that a party is obligated to exercise any of the party's contract 
rights to the party's own detriment for the purpose of benefiting another party to the contract. 
References: MUJI 26.30 
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980) 
Ted R. Brown & Assoc, v. Carner Corp., 753 P.2d 964 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 
VALID OFFER TO PERFORM REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH CONTRACT 
A valid offer to perform requires an offer to perform everything required by the contract. It is not 
enough to offer to do only pan of what is required, unless performance under subsequent pans of 
the contract is conditioned on performance and acceptance of preceding pans of the contract. 
References: MUJI 26.32 
IJI § 12.101. Reprinted with permission; copyright 1991 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 
VALID OFFER TO PERFORM REQUIRES PRESENT ABILITY TO PERFORM 
An offer to perform has no effect if the person making it is unable or unwilling to perform 
according to the offer. This means that at the time performance was supposed to take place, the 
plaintiff must have been in control of resources by which the plaintiff could in fact have performed 
if called on to do so or the plaintiffs offer is of no effect. 
References: MUJI 26.33 
IJI § 12.108. Reprinted with permission; copyright 1991 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 
DUTY TO PERFORM CONDITIONED ON NO UNCURED MATERIAL FAILURE 
If there is an uncured material failure by a party to render performance due at an earlier time, the 
other party shall have no duty to perform under the parties' contract. 
References: MUJI 26.39 
Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer Improvement Dist., 613 P.2d 116 
(Utah 1980) 
McCarren v. Merrill, 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732 (1964) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (1979) 
S 
PERFORMANCE EXCUSED BY MATERIAL BREACH 
The defendant contends the defendants were excused from performing the defendant's remaining 
obligations under the contract because of the plaintiffs conduct in failing to pay suppliers, failing 
to pay for maintenance, failing to pay rent in full and on time and all of the other failures that Ms. 
Jones had on her side. In order to establish this as a justification for not performing the defendant's 
remaining obligations under the contract, the defendant must prove the plaintiff breached an 
important part of what the plaintiff had promised to do. An action or duty is an important part of a 
party's performance under a contract if a reasonable person would not have made the contract 
unless a promise regarding that action or duty had been included. That is, the defendant would be 
excused from performing if the plaintiffs conduct in failing to pay rent, failing to pay for 
improvements, and other failures by Ms. Jones related to an essential part of the agreement 
between the defendant and the plaintiff. On the other hand, if the plaintiff breached only a minor or 
unimportant pan of the contract, the defendant would not be excused from performing. 
Consequently, if you find that the plaintiffs conduct was the type of breach that had something to 
do with an essential part of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, you must find 
that the defendants were excused from further performance under the contract. If you find that the 
plaintiffs conduct was unimportant in relation to what the plaintiff had promised to perform, you 
must find the defendant was required to continue to perform. 
References: MUJI 26.40 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 243 (1979) 
IJI § 12.126. Reprinted with permission; copyright 1991 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 
ELEMENTS OF A MATERIAL BREACH 
In determining whether a failure to perform or offer to perform is material, the following factors 
are significant: 
1. The extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which the party reasonably 
expected; 
2. The extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for that benefit; 
3. The extent to which the non-performing party will suffer forfeiture; 
4. The likelihood that the non-performing party will cure the failure, taking account of all the 
circumstances including any reasonable assurances; 
5. The extent to which the behavior of the non-performing party compons with standards of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
References: MUJI 26.41 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1979) 
5~Q 
PERFORMANCE EXCUSED BY PREVENTION OF PERFORMANCE 
The defendant contends the defendant was excused from performing the defendant's obligations 
under the contract because the plaintiff prevented the defendant from performing. You must 
therefore decide if the plaintiff in any way hindered or obstructed the defendant from performing 
the defendant's part of the bargain. That is, you must determine both of the following: 
1. Whether the defendant was ready, willing and able to perform the defendant's obligations under 
the contract; that is, whether, at the time the defendant's performance was supposed to take place, 
the defendant was in control of, or possessed the resources by which the defendant could in fact 
have performed. 
2. Whether, in addition, the defendant would have performed the defendant's obligations under 
the contract, but the plaintiffs conduct in failing to wait for Baldwins to be ready, willing, and able 
to sell and have a bona fide offer that was acceptable to them prevented or made it impossible for 
the defendant to perform. 
If you find the defendant was ready, willing and able to perform but was prevented from doing so 
because of the plaintiffs conduct, you must find the defendant was excused from performing. 
However, if you find either that the defendant was not ready, willing and able to perform the 
defendant's pan of the contract, or the plaintiffs conduct did not actually prevent or render it 
impossible for the defendant to perform, the defendant was not excused from performing. 
References: MUJI 26.42 
IJI § 12.127. Reprinted with permission; copyright 1991 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 
(A> 
PERFORMANCE EXCUSED BY PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO PERFORM OR OFFER TO 
PERFORM 
As a defense to the defendant's nonperformance under this agreement, the defendant claims that the 
defendant's promised performance and the plaintiffs performance were essential to and dependent 
on each other. In other words, the defendant claims that because the plaintiff did not perform or 
offer to perform as required by the contract, the defendant was not required to perform. 
For the defendant to prevail on this issue, you must find: (1) that the defendant's performance was 
dependent on the plaintiffs performance; and (2) that the plaintiff did not perform or make a valid 
offer to perform the plaintiffs contractual obligations. If the plaintiff did not perform or offer to 
perform, the plaintiff cannot recover under the contract. 
References: MUJI 26.43 
IJI § 13.03. 
MITIGATION 
Damages are not recoverable for loss the plaintiff could have avoided without undue risk, burden 
or humiliation. The plaintiff is not precluded from recovery, however, to the extent the plaintiff has 
made reasonable but unsuccessful effons to avoid loss. 
References: MUJI 26.50 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1979) 
DAMAGES: FORESEEABLE 
Damages are recoverable for loss the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of the 
breach when the contract was made. 
Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it: 
1. Is one that ordinarily follows the breach of such contract in the usual course of events; or 
2. Is a result of special circumstances not in the ordinary course of events, in which a reasonable 
person in the defendant's position would have known that loss would result from the breach. 
References: MUJI 26.51 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 (1979) 
v 
DAMAGES: REASONABLE CERTAINTY 
Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established 
with reasonable certainty. 
References: MUJI 26.52 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (1979) 
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH 
Every contract imposes upon the parties an obligation of good faith in its performance. Good faith 
means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Honesty in fact is an honest belief. 
It is not required that the belief be reasonable, so long as it is an honest belief. 
References: MUJI26.100 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 (1990) 
State Bank v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977) 
FORMATION OF CONTRACT 
^Agreement" means the actual bargain between the parties. A contract for the sale of goods is 
enforceable if the circumstances of the transaction are sufficient to show an agreement. The nature 
of the bargain can be determined by the words used by the parties, earlier dealings between the 
parties, commonly understood customs and practices in the trade or business, and the subsequent 
conduct of the parties in carrying out the agreement in question. A contract does not fail for 
indefiniteness because there is uncertainty as to one or more terms. However, the contract cannot 
be so vague or ambiguous that no reasonable basis exists for enforcing it against one party or the 
other. 
References: MUJI 26.101 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 (1990) 
Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977) 
Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d 939 (Idaho 1978) 
COURSE OF PERFORMANCE 
In contracts involving repeated performances by either parry, the terms of the contract may be 
construed or supplemented by the course of performance between the parties. The course of 
performance is the manner in which the parties have-treated each other and interpreted the contract 
previously. 
References: MUJI 26.103 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208 (1990) 
COURSE OF DEALING 
In contracts involving repeated performances by either party, the-terms of the contract may be 
construed or supplemented by evidence of a prior course of dealing between the parties. A course 
of dealing between parties is the previous conduct of the parties in prior dealings, which 
establishes a common basis of understanding for interpreting each other's conduct and suggests an 
understanding as to how a party's actions may be interpreted by another party. 
/ 
References: MUJI 26.104 / 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208 (1990) 
Power Sys. & Controls v. Keith's Elec. Con&tr. Co., 765 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
\/-\ 
FAIR MARKET VALUE DEFINED 
The fair market value of propeny is defined as the price at which a fully informed, willing owner 
would have voluntarily sold and a fully informed, willing buyer would have voluntarily bought the 
property in question. 
References: MUJI 27.19 
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969) 
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church, 122 Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269 
(1952) 
DAMAGE INSTRUCTIONS CAUTION 
The fact that I have instructed you concerning damages is not to be taken as an indication that I 
either believe or do not believe that the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages. The 
instructions in reference to damages are given as a guide in case you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover. However, if you determine that there should be 
no recovery, then you will entirely disregard the instructions given you upon the matter of 
damages. 
References: MUJI 27.21 
JEFU No. 90.90 (1957) 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing "Defendants' Proposed 
Jury Instructions" was transmitted by facsimile on the below date and subsequently placed in the 
United States Mail with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Jackson Howard 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Fax:801-377-4991 
-Date: 11/22/95 
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and 
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
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P.O. Box 778 
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Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA 
BALDWIN, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY 
J INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 930600024 
Hon. Don V. Tibbs 
Plaintiff submits herewith the following proposed jury instructions numbered 1 through 
DATED this of November, 1995. 
JACKSON HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of November, 1995. 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
10885 South State 
Sandy, UT 84070 
SECRETARY 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
This is an action to enforce a real estate contract. This action is brought by Ada Jones 
against David Baldwin and Gloria Baldwin. The plaintiff claims that she entered into a lease 
agreement with the said defendants which agreement contained an option to purchase. She 
contends that she entered upon the premises located in Boulder, Utah, and operated a cafe 
thereon called the Burr Trail Cafe from the period of June 6, 1984, through the year 1994. The 
plaintiff contends that on May 7, 1993, she exercised her option to purchase in writing, by 
giving the defendants notice of said election, and the defendants rejected such tender on the sole 
basis that they could not provide culinary water to the premises. The plaintiff contends that the 
defendants made no other objection to the tender. Immediately thereafter she brought this suit 
for specific performance. The plaintiff further claims that in February, 1995, the defendants 
ejected her from the premises and took dominion and control over the said property. 
The plaintiff contends that she sustained damages by reason of the failure of the 
defendants to promptly honor her election of her offer to purchase. 
The plaintiff further contends that on May 7, 1993, she exercised her option to purchase 
in writing, by giving the defendants notice of said election, and the defendants rejected such 
tender on the sole basis that they could not provide culinary water to the premises. The plaintiff 
contends that the defendants made no other objection to the tender. 
The defendants contend that the right of the plaintiff was not an option to purchase, but 
rather, a first right of refusal in the event someone else purchased; and the defendants further 
contend that the defendant Gloria Baldwin was not a party to the said agreement and never 
consented to the agreement, and that the agreement is not binding upon her. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You, as jurors in this case, are sitting in an advisory capacity to the Court in matters 
of specific performance. That means that the question of whether the agreement is binding upon 
the parties is a legal question which the Court will resolve, and the question of whether the 
plaintiff is entitled to have the defendants specifically perform the option agreement, if any in 
the agreement, is a matter for the Court to resolve, even though the Court may submit that 
question to you at a later date for your advice on the issue; however the ultimate decision 
regarding whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the contract specifically enforced in terms of 
conveyance to her of the property described in the so-called option agreement will be a decision 
for the Court. 
In the event the Court finds that there is reason to believe that the defendants caused the 
plaintiff damage by reason of their failure to convey the property in a prompt and timely manner 
after an exercise of the option to purchase, then you will be required to determine what 
damages, if any, the plaintiff sustained by reason of the failure of the defendants to honor the 
Plaintiffs tender of May 7, 1993. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In considering what damages the plaintiff may have sustained in this case, you may 
consider what profits the plaintiff may have made during the period of May 7, 1993, through 
November 10, 1995, less whatever income she received from other sources. You will also 
consider what other loss of income she may have been deprived of by reason of the failure of 
the defendants to deliver possession, such as the rental income from her home in Salt Lake City 
had she not been required to live in the said house because of her inability to purchase the 
property in Boulder, Utah. You may also consider as offsets to her profits the fact that she did 
not have to pay rent on the said premises for the year of 1995, but at the same time, she did not 
have to pay interest on the money she would have borrowed to purchase the said property, 
consequently, the payment of rent and the payment of interest to some extent are offsetting sums 
and you may calculate what offsets if any should be allowed. 
You may also consider the question of the reasonable value of the premises on the date 
of the tender vis-a-vis the reasonable value of the premises on November 10, 1995, bearing in 
mind that the premises were an operating business known as the Burr Trail Cafe, and that the 
economics of the locale may have been adversely affected by other businesses that may have 
been attracted to the locale by reason of the absence of the business as operated by the plaintiff, 
giving regard to her expertise and the good will established by her eleven years of previous 
operations. In other words, the difference between the value of the premises on May 7, 1993, 
and the value of the premises on November 10, 1995, if there is in fact a diminution value, 
would be damages to the plaintiff. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
what, if any, negligent conduct the defendant committed, and that such negligence, if any, was 
a proximate cause of injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence what damages, if any, she has sustained as a result 
of the defendants' negligent conduct, if any. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
"Burden of proof1 means the burden of persuasion. A party who has the burden of 
proof must persuade you that his claim is more probably true than not true. In determining 
whether he has met this burden, you will consider all the evidence, whether produced by the 
plaintiff or defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
By a preponderance of the evidence, as that term is used in these instructions, is meant 
that which to your minds is of the greater weight. The evidence preponderates to the side 
which, to your minds, seems to be the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance 
of the evidence is not alone determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the 
testimony, but the convincing character of the testimony weighed by the impartial minds of the 
jury. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Damage is approximately caused by an act, or a failure to act, wherever it appears from 
the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or 
actually causing the damage; and that damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable 
consequence of the act or omission. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be received 
as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by 
education, study and experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, and who 
is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and 
which is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the 
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the 
weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if 
in your judgment the reasons given for it are unsound. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be received 
as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by 
education, study and experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, and who 
is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and 
which is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the 
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the 
weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if 
in your judgment the reasons given for it are unsound. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
This case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a general verdict as is sometimes 
done, but it will be your function to make findings of fact by answering special interrogatories 
or questions which are submitted to you. In making your findings of act, you should bear in 
mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming the fact to be 
true, and he must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. Before you may answer "yes" 
to any question submitted to you, you must find the same to be true by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The agreement of six of the jurors is required to answer any question, and at least 
six of the jurors must agree that the answer to the question should be "yes" before that answer 
may be made. 
Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one of your number to act as a 
foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. 
As soon as you have answered the special interrogatories or questions, you shall have the special 
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then shall return it to this room. 
Instructions numbered 1 through given to the jury this day of 
November, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
J:\JHUONES.INS 
